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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR
CORPORATIONS: THEIR DEVELOPMENT,
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS, AND SOME
THOUGHTS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE
ILENE H. NAGEL*
WINTHROP M. SWENSON

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches have
shared responsibility for setting sentences for offenders convicted of fed-

eral crimes.' The executive branch traditionally influences sentencing
primarily through its authority to initiate prosecution, select appropriate
charges, and enter into plea agreements.2 Congress influences sentencing
by defining criminal conduct and by establishing the range of possible

penalties for violations of criminal law.' The judiciary influences sentencing by selecting sentences for convicted offenders from within the
congressionally prescribed statutory ranges. 4 Over the years, the relative
degree of sentencing authority exercised by each of the three branches
has varied, due in part to changes in the prevailing goals and purposes of

sentencing.
In 1984, in the most dramatic criminal justice reform of this century,
* Ilene H. Nagel is a member of the United States Sentencing Commission and Professor of
Law at the Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law. Winthrop M. Swenson is Deputy
General Counsel and Legislative Counsel of the United States Sentencing Commission. The views
expressed here are those of the individual authors and are not meant to represent the views of the
United States Sentencing Commission. Special thanks are extended to Barry L. Johnson and Karen
E. Kelly for their research assistance.
1. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (federal sentencing "never has been
thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three
Branches of government"). See also Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892-95 (1990) (discussing delegation of legislative sentencing authority to the judiciary between 1880 and the 1960s).
2. See, eg., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (prosecutor has broad authority
to determine whether to prosecute, and what charges to file); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364-65 (1978) (prosecutor has wide discretion in plea bargaining).'
3. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820) (Congress has power to fix
sentences for federal crimes).
4. See Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916) (scope of judicial sentencing discretion subject to congressional control).
5. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 894, 899 (describing legislative delegation of sentencing author-
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Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (the "Act"). 6 Congress
passed the Act with the primary purposes of decreasing unwarranted
sentencing disparity, increasing sentencing uniformity and certainty, and

for some select offenses, increasing sentence severity in order to more
effectively deter and more justly punish convicted offenders.7 While
most sentencing scholars and practitioners believe that individual offenders were the primary targets of sentencing reform, neither the statute nor

the legislative history provides support for the theory that Congress intended to exempt organizational offenders. Accordingly, the full panoply
of reforms enacted by Congress now applies to corporate as well as to
individual offenders.8
While full explication of the terms of the Sentencing Reform Act can
be found elsewhere,9 a brief description of some key features of the Act

and of the federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (the "Sentencing Guidelines" or the "Guidelines") may aid in understanding how and
why the United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") un-

dertook the task of promulgating sentencing guidelines for organizations
convicted of federal crimes.
The Sentencing Reform Act and the FederalSentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act created a new, full-time, bipartisan, in-

dependent agency in the judicial branch-the United States Sentencing
ity to the judiciary, based on prevailing rehabilitative model of sentencing, and subsequent restriction
of that authority when rehabilitative model fell into disfavor).
6. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988)).
7. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 899. See also Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFS7rRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988); S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 [hereinafter S. REP. No.
225].
8. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8 (1992) (Sentencing of Organizations) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
9. For descriptions of the purposes and terms of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines, see, eg., Breyer, supra note 7, at 6-31; Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Death of Discretion?Reflections on the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 101 -ARV. L. REv. 1938, 1944-51 (1988); Nagel, supra
note 1, at 899-906, 913-39.
The proposals and provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act also are explored in the Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and in the briefs submitted in
Mistretta. See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4-15, United
States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028); Brief for Joseph F. DiGenova et al. as
Amicus Curiae at 16-21, United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028). See
generally S. REp. No. 225, supra note 7.
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Commission-and assigned it the responsibility for developing and implementing a consistent, just and rational sentencing policy.10 The Act
requires the Commission to promulgate guidelines and policy statements
for federal district court judges to use in determining the type and duration of sentences to be imposed on offenders convicted of federal
crimes.II The statute provides that these sentences must be responsive to
the goals of just punishment for the offense, deterrence, incapacitation
and rehabilitation.' 2 This commitment to multiple goals represents a
substantial shift in sentencing policy away from the overwhelming emphasis on rehabilitation which governed federal sentencing in the decades
preceding 1984.13 Moreover, by stressing the importance of the just punishment and deterrence rationales of sentencing, the statute also
prompted a shift in the focus of sentencing by requiring greater attention
to the characteristics of the offense, and less attention to the offender's
personal characteristics. 4
The Sentencing Reform Act clearly reflects Congress' decision to take
back from individual judges much of the sentencing discretion it previously had delegated to them, and to vest that discretion instead in the
Commission, a single administrative body. Congress created the Commission specifically to devote its full attention to developing a uniform
sentencing policy, based on research and reflection, and to implement
that policy through a system of guidelines and policy statements. 15
Appointed in 1985, the United States Sentencing Commission, consistent with its statutory mandate, submitted its first set of proposed guide§§ 991, 994, 995.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (requiring judges to consider the four basic purposes of sentencing before imposing a particular sentence).
13. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 38-40, 50 (rejecting the "outmoded" model of "coercive rehabilitation" in favor of congressional recognition of just punishment, deterrence and incapacitation, as well as rehabilitation).
14. See Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
31 VILL. L. REv. 1291, 1293 (1986). This shift away from emphasis on offender characteristics was,
in part, the natural consequence of rejection of the rehabilitative model of incarceration and its focus
on the personal background and characteristics of the offender. It was also a result of Congress'
explicit instructions that the Commission draft guidelines "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders," and that the Commission's guidelines
"reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(e).
15. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 995.
10. See 28 U.S.C.
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lines for individual offenders to Congress in May 1987.16 The guidelines
for individual offenders became effective in November 1987.17 These
guidelines are binding on sentencing courts, absent a finding that there

are aggravating or mitigating circumstances warranting a decision to depart from the prescribed guidelines and to impose a different sentence."'
Such departures are subject to appeal. 19
Once the initial package of sanctions for individual offenders became
law, the Commission turned its attention to the question of sentencing

policy for corporate and other organizational offenders. This Article
traces the substantive terms of the dialogue and debate that led the Commission in 1991 to promulgate guidelines for the sentencing of organizations convicted of federal offenses. As with the guidelines for the
sentencing of individual offenders, Congress passed no bill rejecting the

Commission's proposed package of organizational sanctions; thus, these
guidelines automatically became law six months later in November
1991.20 To date, courts have sentenced very few organizational offenders
under the corporate Sentencing Guidelines because they generally apply

only to prospective criminal conduct, 21 and criminal cases against orga16. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY

STATEMENTS (Apr. 13, 1987). These guidelines also included one broad provision governing the
sentencing of organizations convicted of antitrust offenses, see id. § 2R1.1, that has since been superseded by the corporate guidelines promulgated in 1991. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, ch. 8.
17. See Breyer, supra note 7, at 1 n.2 (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act "provided that
the proposed Guidelines would take effect six months after they were submitted, unless Congress
modified or disapproved the Guidelines").
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (providing that a sentencing court shall impose a sentence within
the range specified by the guidelines "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance... not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described" by the
guidelines).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (providing that either the defendant or the government may appeal a
sentence that is outside the guidelines range, imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
guidelines, or imposed in violation of law).
20. See 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762 (1991).
21. While Congress did not appear to anticipate this result, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (5)
(providing that a sentencing court consider policies and guidelines "in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced"), the courts of appeals have held uniformly that the guidelines in effect at the time
of sentencing may not be used if they punish more severely than those in effect at the time of the
offense. See, eg., United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Kopp, 951
F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Nagi, 947 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); United States v. Sweeten,
933 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 225 (1991); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990);
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nizations typically take years to ripen.2 2 Nevertheless, the mere publication of these new rules appears to have spurred some sweeping changes in
the corporate world.
There is increasing evidence in recent months that many American
businesses are revisiting-or considering seriously for the first timetheir in-house policies toward employee noncompliance with the law and
related misconduct.23 According to one distinguished federal prosecutor,

"[flor the first time, corporations have been conscripted into the fight
against crimes."'2 4 If this assertion is true, the question one may ask is
how did private companies come to be "drafted" into a war against corporate crime? Although other forces are surely at work,25 the new corporate2 6 Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States
United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Worthy, 915
F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). In light of the concerns raised by these decisions, practitioners appear to
be taking the approach that the organizational guidelines should be applied only to conduct occurring on or after the November 1, 1991 effective date.
22. See Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice
in the FederalCourts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247 (1991).
23. See generally Margaret Cronin Fisk, Helping CorporationsComply with Rules is New Legal
Business, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1992, at S4; Barbara Franklin, Get Ready for Guidelines: Clients are
Urged to Take ComplianceSeriously, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 1991, at 5; David S.Machlowitz, Making a
Compliance Program Work- A PracticalGuide, AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 16 (special supplement
highlighting preventive law for corporate counsel to comply with the organizational sentencing
guidelines); Barnaby J. Feder, Helping CorporateAmerica Hew to the Straight and Narrow, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at F5 (companies fighting the high cost of misconduct with ethics programs).
In December 1990, the Ethics Resource Center and the Behavior Research Center published a
survey of corporate compliance policies. The detailed survey leads to the conclusion that substantial
numbers of American corporations had, at best, marginal compliance policies. See ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER & BEHAVIOR RESEARCH CENTER, ETHICS POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN AMERI-

CAN BUSINESS (1990).
24. Otto G. Obermaier, Drafting Companies to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at
F11.
25. For example, contractors in the defense industry have voluntarily agreed to principles requiring self-policing with regard to potential violations of the law. The agreement, known as the
Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct ("DII") was described in DEFENSE
INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PUB-

LIC AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL REPORT]. The Department of Defense Inspector General Voluntary Disclosure Program supplements the DII by
providing incentives, in the form of a reduced risk of prosecution and other sanctions, to companies
to voluntary disclose violations. See id. at A-35 to A-38. The Environmental Protection Agency
recently adopted criteria closely tracking the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" as the criteria it will use in determining whether a
company debarred from federal contracting for an environmental violation will be permitted to renew contracting. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,785, 64,787 (1991).
26. Strictly construed, the Guidelines apply to all convicted "organizations," see U.S.S.G.,
supra note 8, § 8A1.1, although almost all federal organizational defendants are for-profit corpora-
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Sentencing Commission in 199127 may have constituted the chief impetus
for this development because they create specific and substantial incentives for organizations to take preventive measures to reduce the likelihood that their employees will commit crimes. They also create
incentives for corporations to take measures that should increase the likelihood that employees who do commit crimes will be held accountable
for their misconduct.
The centerpiece of the Sentencing Guidelines structure is the fine
range, from which a sentencing court selects the precise fine to impose on
a convicted organization. The Commission designed the guideline provisions that established the fine range to meld the two philosophical approaches to sentencing emphasized in the enabling legislation: just
punishment for the offense, and deterrence. By varying the fine based on
whether, and to what extent, a company has acted "responsibly" with
respect to an offense, the Guidelines embody a "just punishment for the
offense" philosophy.2 8 Consistent with this paradigm,29 the Guidelines
provide for substantial fines when a convicted organization has encouraged, or has been indifferent to, violations of the law by its employees, but impose significantly lower fines when a corporation has clearly
demonstrated in specified ways its antipathy toward lawbreaking. At the
same time, the guideline structure embodies principles derived from the
deterrence paradigm.3" The specified ways in which a convicted organization may demonstrate its intolerance of criminal conduct, thus entitions. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS (Aug. 30, 1991) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
While this Article will generally refer to the new organizational guidelines as "corporate" Sentencing
Guidelines for this reason, the Guidelines govern the sentencing of all federal organizational
defendants.

27. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, ch. 8.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 75-76.
29. For discussions of the theory ofjust punishment, see Steven Walt & William Laufer, Corporate CriminalLiability and the ComparativeMix of Sanctions, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 309 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992); KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR
CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990); John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals,73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723 (1982); Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and WhiteCollar Criminality: A Response to Dr. Braithwaite, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1164 (1982);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 76. For general discussions of
the theory of deterrence, see Jeffrey S. Parker, CriminalSentencing Policy for Organizations: The
Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 554-61 (1989); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985); Brent Fisse,
Reconstructing Corporate CriminalLaw: Deterrence,Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1141 (1983); Richard Posner, Optimal Sentencesfor White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM.

19931

THE GUIDELINES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

tling it to a more lenient sentence, are actions that, at least
theoretically,3 ' should discourage employees from committing offenses.
The process by which the Commission reached consensus on what
should be the philosophical underpinnings of the organizational guidelines and how to draft guidelines to serve these principles was compli-

cated and protracted. This Article traces the Sentencing Commission's

path in completing that task32 and considers what work lies ahead. The
Article addresses four specific questions: (1) Given that the Commis-

sion's primary mandate is to facilitate greater certainty, uniformity, effectiveness and rationality in the sentencing of individuals, why did the

Commission tackle the area of corporate sentencing at all? (2) How did
the Commission arrive at the philosophical bases that underlie the fine
provisions of the corporate sentencing guidelines? (3) How did the principles of deterrence and just punishment for the offense shape the Com-

mission's decisionmaking with respect to the key structural issues
involved in creating the corporate fine guidelines, and what other factors
played a role in the construction of these guidelines? and (4) Are the

corporate Sentencing Guidelines cast in stone, or can organizations and
attorneys expect changes in the future?
II. QUESTION ONE: WHY DID THE COMMISSION VENTURE INTO
THE THORNY AREA OF CORPORATE SENTENCING?

As early as 1986, one year after the appointment of the first members
to the Commission and one year before the promulgation of the first33
L. REV. 409 (1980); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL

(1973).
31. The Sentencing Guidelines for organizations are unprecedented for many reasons. Not
only do they embody the first comprehensive system of sentencing laws for corporations, but they
also codify an incentive-based approach to corporate sanctions that has never been utilized before, at
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL

least not in this detailed and comprehensive a form. Cf U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM (DODIG), see 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25,

at A-35 to A-36 (containing similar self-policing incentives as those in the Guidelines, but the Guidelines are more far-reaching in conduct considered, and are more definite in the penalties prescribed).
Because the Guidelines are relatively new, time and experience may eventually demonstrate ways
they can become more effective. Thus, one can expect the Guidelines to evolve.
32. Seven voting members comprise the Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Because it is a collegial decisionmaking body, whose members have personal perspectives that will not
necessarily be fully expressed through formal votes or the discourse of public meetings, definitive
characterizations of its decisions are impossible. This Article will therefore offer interpretations of
the more important decisions the Commission made regarding the Sentencing Guidelines for
organizations.
33. The Sentencing Commission's enabling statute contemplates that "(t]he Commission peri-
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iteration of individual sentencing guidelines, the Commission held its
first public hearing on the topic of sentences for organizations convicted
of federal crimes.3 4 The Commission, due to time constraints and the
complexity of the objectives at issue, deferred promulgation of any organizational sentencing rules until after the guidelines for individuals had
been implemented.3 5 A fundamental question that arose at the outset of
the Commission's work on organizational sanctions continued to permeate its deliberative process: should the Commission involve itself in the
area of corporate sentencing?

The Commission understood Congress' principal concern in establishing the Commission: unfettered judicial sentencing discretion fostered
unwarranted disparity and discrimination, and other unsatisfactory results36 in the sentencing of individuals. Congress focused primarily upon

the sentencing of individuals when it enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act.37 The Act's lengthy legislative history contained, for example, only

a handful of explicit references to organizational sentencing. While the
presence of these references made clear that Congress did not intend for
organizational offenders to be exempt from this scheme for sentencing

reform, none of these references irrefutably demonstrated that Congress
expected the Commission to promulgate mandatory guidelines for corpo-

rate offenses. 38 With prominent representatives of the business commuodically shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the
guidelines." 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). Congress may amend the guidelines once a year between the date
that a new session of Congress commences (generally, early January) and May 1. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(p). Congress then has 180 days to review the guideline amendments, which will become effective automatically, unless Congress enacts legislation to the contrary. Id. The first set of guidelines
took effect on November 1, 1987. Because ofthe demanding goals ofthe Sentencing Reform Act, see
generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), 994; S.REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 161-84, the complexity of
crafting guidelines that fully achieve these goals, and changing statutory penalties enacted by Congress, the Commission has already made nearly 500 refinements to the guidelines. See U.S.S.G.,
supra note 8, app. C (amendments to GUIDELINES MANUAL).
34. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at 3.
35. Id. at 1.
36. The unduly lenient sentences for some offenses in the existing sentencing practice concerned
Congress. Thus, the enabling statute required the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect
the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense." 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
37. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7.
38. See id. at 66-67, 97, 166. Indeed, in its most direct discussion of how the Commission
might treat organizational offenses, the Senate Report stated:
Another area in which the Sentencing Commission might wish to issue general policy statements concerns the imposition of sentence upon organizations convicted of criminal of.
fenses .... Given the breadth of discretion thus available to the court in the context of
sentencing an organizational defendant, the Committee believes that it would be appropri-
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nity urging the Commission to refrain from entering this highly complex

area 39 and alleging that no statutory requirement for the Commission to
promulgate corporate guidelines existed, why, then, did the Commission

venture ahead?
A.

Statutory Guidance
Although the Commission never formally determined that its enabling

statute required the promulgation of organizational sentencing guidelines, certain individual Commissioners clearly held this view. To sup-

port his belief that organizational guidelines were statutorily mandated,
one Commissioner cited Congress' pronouncement inthe enabling legis-

lation that an organization must be sentenced to a term of probation or a
fine;'

he cited as well a seemingly straightforward directive in another

section that the Commission "shall promulgate... guidelines... for use
of a sentencing court in determining... whether to impose a sentence to
[sic] probation, [or] a fine... [and] the appropriate amount of a fine or

the appropriate length of a term of probation."41 Since these congressional directives to the Commission failed to mention an explicit excep-

tion for organizations, and since the sanctions involved clearly pertained
to organizations, this Commissioner believed that the Commission was
ate for the Sentencing Commission, by means of policy statements, to provide guidance to
sentencing judges concerning such matters as: (1) considerations relevant to the coordination of criminal sanctions imposed with any civil remedies that may be available under the
circumstances; (2) considerations relevant to the imposition of sanctions involving forfeiture, notice to victims, and restitution; and (3) considerations relevant to the selection of
conditions of probation involving such judicial monitoring of the activities of a convicted
organization as may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 166.
Because the Senate Report used the words "might wish to issue" and referred to "general policy
statements," some argued that Congress intended the Commission to act cautiously in this area.
Those who believed that Congress created a statutory duty for the Commission to issue binding
guidelines for corporate sentencing, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, noted that the
topics the report identified for possible treatment through policy statements did not include the key
issues of fine amount and whether to impose probation.
39. See, eg., Comments of the American Corporate Counsel Association on Proposed Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (on file with the authors). The Association stated:
In light of these factors, one must wonder why the Commission is going through this
exercise ....For the Commission to proceed to address a problem that may only exist in
theory without a solid fact base does not seem to be the best use of Commission or Congressional resources and may well inflict real harm on the business entities subject to the
guidelines.
Id. at 2.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c)(1), (2).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A), (B).
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obligated-if not immediately, then at least at some point in the near
future-to promulgate probation and fine guidelines for convicted
corporations. 42
Other Commissioners were less persuaded by this formal legal argument than by their interpretation of the broader mandate Congress gave
the Commission. In addition to a range of specific requirements relating
to guideline and policy statement promulgation,4 3 Congress conferred on
the Commission a general duty to "establish sentencing policies and
practices for the [fjederal criminal justice system" that satisfy several
objectives relating to effectiveness, just punishment, uniformity and certainty.' Some Commissioners believed that this more general mandate
obligated the Commission to explore the possible benefits of issuing corporate sentencing rules.

B. Evidence that the Courts Lacked a CoherentRationalefor
Sentencing Corporations
In the decade preceding the Commission's work on organizational

sanctions, the relevant literature clearly illustrated a lack of consensus
among academics regarding corporate sentencing. 45 More directly rele-

vant to the Commission's mandate, there was evidence that some federal
courts struggled with the normative question of what are the most appropriate sanctions for corporations. Furthermore, an initial empirical examination of sentencing practices in the past, undertaken by the

Commission in 1988, yielded some inconclusive but troubling findings.46
42. See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (requiring that the Commission establish a sentencing range
"for each category of offense involving each category of defendant," and containing no exception for
organizational defendants).
43. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (using the word "including" to indicate
that statutorily listed requirements for guideline promulgation were not intended to be exhaustive);
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 161. Congressional hearings showed that at least some members of
Congress believed the Commission had a general duty to promulgate corporate guidelines. See generally Oversight on the US. Sentencing Commission and Guidelines for OrganizationalSanctions:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Guidelinesfor OrganizationalSanctions: Hearings].
45. See generally Michael K. Block & Joseph G. Sidak, The Cost ofAntitrust Deterrence: Why
Not Hang a PriceFixer Now and Then?, 68 Gao. L.J. 1131 (1980); John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate
Crime andPunishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economicsof CriminalSanctions, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 419 (1980); Fisse, supra note 30; Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals,
supra note 30; SCHLEGEL, supra note 29; von Hirsch, Desert and White-Collar Criminality, supra
note 29.

46. Mark A. Cohen et al., Report on Sentencing of Organizationsin the FederalCourts, 1984-
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For example, this research, limited only to a review of sentences imposed
upon corporations that had the ability to pay a fine, found that the median fine courts imposed on organizations convicted of criminal offenses
was substantially less than the actual dollar loss caused by the offense.4 7
Since the profit from an economic crime is often the same as the loss the
offense caused, this finding raised the specter that prevailing federal sentencing practices for convicted corporations were, in essence, ensuring
that crime pays.48
This same research effort revealed evidence of an additional problem
of particular relevance to the Sentencing Commission's mission:
[T]he most obvious pattern [in the study] is the large amount of disparity in
the system. There are many instances where virtually identical crimes and
losses result in different sanctions, both absolutely and in terms of the calculated sanction/loss and fine/loss multiples.
For example, the sample contained two similar cases of odometer tampering with very different sentencing outcomes. In one case, the total sanction
was over three times the loss, as the firm was ordered to pay full restitution
and given a fine over twice the loss. In the other case, the firm was fined
about 1/3 the loss and no restitution was ordered. A second example of
disparity concerns two virtually identical instances of mislabeling beef. In
one case, the fine was 2 1/2 times the loss; in the other it was only [four
percent]9 of the loss. Solvency did not appear to be an issue in any of these
4
cases.
While the Commission's own research focused on unwarranted disparity among corporations convicted of similar offenses, it also recognized
that some members of Congress, and a majority of the public, perceived
an unwarranted disparity in the severity of sentences meted out to white
collar offenders when compared to the severity of sentences meted out to
non-white collar offenders.5 0 This perception is consistent with the long1987, in

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, DISCUSSION MATERIALS ON ORGANIZA-

(1988) [hereinafter DISCUSSION MATERIALS].
47. See id. at 7-11.
48. Criminal fines may comprise only a portion of the monetary sanctions imposed on a corporation. Overall, the study found that the total monetary sanctions imposed approximately equaled
the loss in the median case. Id. at 21 (tbl. 9). Given that not all offenses are detected, this figure
lends further credence to the theory that the federal sentencing system was making crime profitable
for some organizational offenders.
49. Id. at 10-11.
50. See, eg., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, pt.6, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 647 (1990) (statements by Sen. Kennedy and
Sentencing Commission nominee Julie E. Carnes) [hereinafter Hearingson Appointments]. See also
infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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standing research tradition of social science that provides evidence of

preferential treatment for white collar offenders.

1

Finally, during the same period of time when some continued to argue

that Congress never intended the Commission to take action in this area,
the repeated formal and informal requests from members of the Senate

and House Judiciary Committees regarding the Commission's progress
on, and proposals for, organizational sanctions patently contradicted the
contention that Congress intended organizations convicted of federal
crimes to be exempt from its scheme for sentencing reform. 2
On balance, since the Commission's empirical examination of

sentences meted out to convicted corporations before 1988 strongly supported the belief that promulgation of corporate guidelines might further
the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, the Commissioners decided that
drafting workable and reasonable corporate sentencing rules would serve
the Commission's broader mandate of establishing sound and effective

sentencing policies for the federal courts.
In addition to the above, the Commission undertook a review of re-

ported decisions specifying sentences for convicted corporations. This
review revealed that some courts imposed such sanctions as "corporate

imprisonment"
ics.54

3

or the compulsory endowment of a faculty chair in eth-

The Commission judged these sanctions to be ineffective or incon-

51. See, eg.,

STANTON

WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT:

THE SENTENCING OF

(1988); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNcuT VERSION (1983); John L. Hagan & Ilene H. Nagel, White Collar Crime, White Collar Time:
The Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in the Southern Districtof New York, 20 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 259 (1982); Ilene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals in
FederalCourts: A Socio-Legal Explorationof Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982); MARSHALL
B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 284-98 (1980); Gilbert Geis, White Collar
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS

Crime: The Heavy ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Casesof 1961, in CRIMINAL

BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS:

A TYPOLOGY 139 (Marshall B. Clinard & Richard Quinney eds., 1967).
52. See, eg., Guidelinesfor OrganizationalSanctions: Hearings, supra note 44; Hearings on
Appointments, supra note 50, at 646-49 (question posed by Senator Kennedy).
53. See United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Va. 1988), rev'd in
relevant part, 870 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1989) (tbl.).
54. See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984). See also
United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984) (vacating condition of probation that corporate defendants use promotional business to raise money for charities designated by
the probation office); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984) (vacating sentence of probation which imposed charitable contributions); United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l
Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding a sentence requiring three companies to lend highlevel executives' services to charity for one year without compensation and to pay contributions to
the same charity); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.) (upholding requirement that
white collar defendant accept full-time employment without salary in a charitable organization as
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sistent with the goals of sentencing articulated in the enabling legislation.

The revelation of these ad hoc sentencing schemes provided further support that the Commission needed to formulate systematic corporate sen-

tencing rules."5 The Commission determined that a consistent, rational
policy for organizational sanctions was necessary. Given the enormous
complexity of the undertaking, the question was whether the Commission could settle on an approach to developing such rules.
III. QUESTION TWO: How DID THE COMMISSION ARRIVE AT THE
JUST PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE-RELATED
PHILOSOPHIES THAT UNDERLIE THE CORPORATE
SANCTIONS PROMULGATED TO
CONGRESS?

A.

The Search for "OptimalPenalties"

While the Commission was not able to commence sustained work on
organizational sanctions until after the initial set of guidelines for individual offenders was in place, the 1986 "Preliminary Draft" of sentencing
guidelines for individuals laid the groundwork for later deliberations.5 6

In addition to setting forth draft guidelines for individual offenders
designed to elicit public comment, the Preliminary Draft contained a
general discussion of issues specifically related to organizational sentencing.5 7 Reflecting the two predominant schools of thought, the Preliminary Draft posited that organizational "[flines may accomplish the
purposes of just punishment and deterrence, but those two purposes have
different implications for the structure of fines."518 At the time of the
Preliminary Draft the primary Commissioner proponents of these two
schools of sentencing had strict and conflicting notions of how guidelines
part of probation), cert denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers
Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976) (vacating sentence of probation which included financial contribution to county alcoholism council); United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594
(9th Cir. 1974) (upholding condition of probation requiring company not to engage in the distribution of pornographic material); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (requiring bakery companies to donate fresh baked goods to specified charitable
organizations).
55. The courts lacked a coherent approach to corporate sentencing. These cases are not only
complex, but individual judges must address them only occasionally. See infra text accompanying
notes 86-87.
56. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].

57. Id. at 161-66.
58. Id. at 162.
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should be structured to achieve their respective ends. Eventually, however, the Commission determined that a more relaxed conceptualization

of these two purposes could coexist harmoniously in a single guideline
structure. 59
In 1988, after the first set of individual guidelines had gone into effect,

the Commission elected to proceed with an exploration of what it termed
the "deterrence" approach as articulated in the Preliminary Draft. In
reality, the deterrence approach under review was a version of the "law

and economics" theory of "optimal penalties."'

The Commission de-

cided to use the optimal penalties model as the primary means by which
to elicit and examine public comment on organizational sentencing issues

for two principal reasons. First, in the context of organizational as contrasted to individual penal sanctions, the theory of optimal penalties was
relatively well developed-at least in concept, if not in detail. Just punishment was less well developed in theory and in practice. 61 In addition,
using the optimal penalties approach allowed the Commission to avoid

the initial conceptual hurdle of what it means to "justly" punish an entity
that has "'no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked.' "62 Second,

the leading proponent on the Commission for a strict just punishment
approach to sentencing had recently resigned from the Commission. His
resignation was prompted in part by the Commission's rejection of his
proposed guideline structure, a system derived from the just punishment
paradigm.6 3 The leading proponent of the optimal penalties paradigm

was chairman of the Commission's organizational sanctions project.
According to its proponents, a guideline structure adhering to the opti-

mal penalties approach required that a court base fines on two calcula59. See infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text. This change occurred after a change in the
Commission's membership. In 1986, Commissioner Paul Robinson was a proponent of a strict application of the just desert paradigm. Commissioner Michael Block was a proponent of a strict
"optional penalties" deterrence-oriented approach. The Commission moved toward more flexible
treatment of the purposes of sentencing after these Commissioners had resigned. See Nagel, supra
note 1, at 914-20.
60. For further discussion of the optimal penalties approach, see supra note 30 (authorities
cited therein).
61. For a description of how the Commission initially conceptualized organizational guidelines
under a just punishment approach, see PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 56, at 164. For further
discussion of the just punishment theory, see supra note 29 (authorities cited therein).
62. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An UnscandalizedInquiry
Into The Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward,
First Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England).
63. For a discussion of the Commission's deliberations regarding the just desert draft guidelines, see Nagel, supra note 1, at 918-20.
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tions: "the value, converted into money, of all harm caused [by the
offense] and the probability of conviction."" While the challenge of reducing harms to monetary terms proved formidable, the Commission
was willing to undertake these challenges, as demonstrated by the approach it ultimately adopted in the corporate fine guidelines.65 However,
the Commission received what later proved to be insurmountable objections to other aspects of the optimal penalties approach in the form in
which it was advanced.
The first of these objections related to the implementation of the requirement that fines be based, in part, on the likelihood of conviction. In
a set of draft guidelines the Commission circulated for public comment
in 1988,66 the likelihood of conviction was to be measured by estimates of
the probability of detection; these estimates were derived from survey
responses as to likely detection rates for each individual offense. 67 After
an exhaustive but frustrating effort, the strict optimal penalties proponents on the Commission and Commission staff conceded that "[a]ny
estimates of multiples [reflecting the probability of detection], however
they are derived, are likely to be fairly rough approximations. ' 6 They
believed, however, that rough estimates in the cause of a pure theory
were better than any next best alternative.6 9
In the end, the majority of Commissioners could not support this
method of determining what are the optimal penalties for each category
of offense. Estimates about the probability of detection based on nonrandom survey responses were judged to be too "rough," bordering on
mere assumptions; empirical verification of these rough estimates was
impossible. Furthermore, the optimal penalties draft guidelines contemplated that judges would make subsequent independent judgments as to
whether any of ten specified factors had "materially increased [or de64. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 56, at 164.
65. Part C of the Guidelines governs the imposition of fines and requires judges to make two
principal calculations, one assessing the seriousness of the offense, see U.S.S.G., supra note 8,
§ 8C2.4, the other assessing an organization's "culpability." See id. § 8C2.5. The former calculation generally uses three alternative measures to gauge offense seriousness, including the "loss" the
offense caused. See id. § 8C2.4(a)(3). In some instances, the Guidelines provide special rules that
serve as proxies for measuring loss. See id. §§ 8C2.4(b), 8C2.4 (comment. (n.5)).
66. See Proposed Chapter Eightfor the Guidelines Manual,in DISCUSSION MATERIALS, supra
note 46.
67. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,§§ 8B3.1, 8B3.2.
68. Parker, supra note 30, at 55.
69. Id.
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creased] the difficulty of detecting and prosecuting the offense."' 70 Thus,
a sentencing court would, in each case, have to modify the presumptive
offense multiple, where the presumptive offense multiple reflected mere
estimates of the probability of detection. This approach, requiring each
sentencing judge to make an independent assessment of an inherently
speculative factor-but one that could substantially affect the fine-appeared unworkable to the majority of the Commissioners, however persuasive or noble the theory of optimal penalties was in the abstract.
Other concerns with the pure optimal penalties approach, as it was
proposed, included: (1) an exaggerated concern for the possibility of
overdeterrence; (2) the view of corporate probation as never an appropriate sanction; (3) the fact that the approach completely disregarded the
organization's gain when assessing the seriousness of the offense; and
(4) the perception that in certain circumstances, the proposed fines appeared to result in unjust or ineffective sanctions.
Regarding the proposal of probation as a corporate sanction, the Commission included in the 1988 Discussion Materials (in which the draft
optimal penalties guidelines figured significantly) an exploration by three
prominent academics of a more expansive use of probation than the law
and economics adherents supported.7 1 The academics argued that while
limitations on the use of corporate probation were important,
there is no reason why a sentencing court, following a criminal conviction
based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, should have less flexibility in
the preventive restraints that it can impose than another federal court,
which may grant an injunction in a civil action brought by an 72administrative agency based only upon a preponderance of the evidence.
Ultimately every Commissioner, except one, was persuaded that the
strict optimal penalties approach to probation was too grudging and too
restrictive, 73 at least in the form in which it had been advanced. The
majority of the Commission wanted to explore the viability of corporate
probation as part of any package of sanctions submitted for congressional
70. ProposedChapterEightfor the GuidelinesManual,in DISCUssION MATERIALS, supra note
46, §§ 8B3.1, 8B3.2.

71. See John C. Coffee, Jr., et al., DraftProposalon Standardsfor OrganizationalProbation,in
supra note 46.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Ultimately, the Commission chose to afford courts a large degree of discretion in determining whether to impose probation. The Commission's probation guidelines established several
mandatory grounds for probation. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8D1.1(1)-(5). In addition, the courts
retain flexibility to impose probation in other instances. Id. §§ 8D1.1(6), (8). See infra notes 149-54
and accompanying text.
DISCUssION MATERIALS,
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review. Furthermore, a majority of the Commission rejected the optimal
penalties adherents' strong belief that loss alone, and not the profit or
"gain" from an offense, should establish the base amount of the fine,74

because this view directly conflicted with the congressional policy set
forth in the general fine statute.7 5 The idea also evoked concern that
organizations would have an incentive to break the law if the potential
loss was uncertain or speculative, but the potential profit from the offense
was significant.7 6

A final concern with the strict optimal penalties approach related to
the tension between theoretical ideals and the real world. For example,

the concept of deriving an "optimal" penalty for an offense assumes that
precisely the right fine will induce the corporation to expend precisely

the right quantity of resources to "control" its agents and prevent them
from breaking the particular law in question.77 Suppose, however, that a
firm responded to the threatened sanction by exerting its best efforts to
achieve compliance-diligent efforts by any objective measure--and, despite these efforts, one of its employees violated the law. It is well settled

in legal scholarship that the interests of employees and the corporation
often diverge. 78 The question for the Commission was whether to treat
at sentencing a company that clearly demonstrated good faith and diligent efforts to achieve compliance the same as a company that made no
compliance-related effort at all. This question arose because, under fed-

eral law, an organization's compliance efforts generally will not insulate
it from criminal liability.7 9 Under the strict optimal penalties approach

advanced to the Commission, the fine imposed on a company that had
rigorously attempted to achieve compliance generally would be the same
74. See Parker, supra note 30, at 35-42.
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (providing for an alternative fine maximum based on twice the
pecuniary gain or loss from the offense). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2) (1988) (establishing maximum civil penalties for insider trading of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided).
76. Proponents of the optimal penalties approach conceded this flaw, but argued that only in
rare circumstances would gain significantly exceed loss. Parker, supra note 30, at 40. The Commission's later research verified that gain would exceed loss in only about two percent of the cases. See
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at 22. However, since ignoring gain in these cases could
result in profitable crime, and since Congress had provided for the use of gain in setting fines, see
supra note 75, the Commission was extremely reluctant to ignore this measure of offense seriousness.
As adopted, the fine guidelines for organizations establish the measure of offense seriousness by
requiring a sentencing court to use the highest of three alternative methods, including gain. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.4.
77. See Parker, supra note 30, at 4.
78. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 393-400.
79. See infra note 157.
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as the fine imposed on a company that made no serious effort to achieve
compliance."0 The Commission's early sensitivity to this limitation in
the optimal penalties approach sowed the seeds for the just punishment
principles it incorporated into the corporate guidelines ultimately
enacted.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons and others the Commission concluded in late 1989, after a protracted review of the approach favored by

the law and economics community, that a pure optimal penalties/deterrence based system of sanctions would not lead to a workable

and defensible set of corporate guidelines."1
B.

No Safety in Numbers

The Commission's enabling statute requires that in the development of
its guidelines, the Commission consider the "average sentences imposed"
for relevant categories of cases sentenced in the past.8 2 The same statu-

tory provision advises that "the Commission shall not be bound by such
average sentences," and expressly cautions that any guidelines promul-

gated should "reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do
not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense." 83 Given these statutory directives, after an extensive review and a significant number of normative refinements, the Commission found that in setting penalty levels
for individuals it clearly could not "write guidelines rotely mimicking

past practice," 8'4 but concluded that past practice could serve as a useful
80. The optimal penalties draft guidelines listed compliance efforts aimed exclusively at prevention as one of the 10 factors that the court should consider in deciding whether the case was atypical
in terms of the detectibility of the offense. See ProposedChapterEightfor the GuidelinesManual,in
DIscussIoN MATERIALS, supra note 46, § 8B3.2. Under this approach, because preventive compliance efforts constituted only one of 10 potentially relevant factors, one could generally expect compliance efforts to have, at most, a marginal impact on the fine.
81. It is possible that if the proponents of the law and economics approach had been amenable
to a system of guidelines derived largely rather than exclusively from the optimal penalties/deterrence theoretical paradigm, support for adopting such a guideline system might have
emerged. However, as in the development of the individual guidelines, those who subscribed to a
particular theoretical perspective, either just deserts or deterrence, viewed compromise as unacceptable. In both instances, however, attaining consensus for such a strict approach was difficult because
a majority of the Commission was committed to an amalgam approach, where guidelines would
serve the twin purposes of just deserts and deterrence. The majority emphasized the statute and
Congress' rejection of single purpose guidelines to justify their position. See infra notes 123-31 and
accompanying text.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
83. Id.
84. Nagel, supra note 1, at 928.
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starting point or "anchor" for its analysis.8" In contrast to the guidelines
for sentencing individual offenders, past practice played a considerably
less pronounced role in the development of the corporate guidelines, especially with respect to setting penalty levels. There are essentially five
reasons why past practice data were less significant in the corporate
context.
First, as with any empirical analysis, a sufficient quantity of data is
necessary if generalizations based on these data are to be robust, valid,
and reliable. The Commission's review of data on sentencing for the
years 1984 through 1990 demonstrated that the federal courts sentenced
approximately 300 to 400 convicted organizations each year.8 6 In comparison, the federal courts sentenced approximately 40,000 to 45,000
convicted individuals each year.87 Furthermore, significant variations
among past organizational defendants, in terms of net worth, gross annual revenue, and other factors, existed within the relatively small universe of organizational sentencing cases. 8 Thus, from the outset, it was
clear that it would be difficult to draw supportable generalizations from
this small population of heterogeneous cases.
Second, as described above,8 9 the Commission's empirical research
strongly suggested that past organizational sentencing practices were suspect from a normative perspective. Profits derived from many past offenses apparently exceeded the monetary sanctions imposed.
Furthermore, courts sometimes relied on questionable "penalties" such
as compulsory contributions to court-designated charities. Requiring the
corporation to give to charity prompted some critics to argue that the
courts, while well meaning, were devising sanctions that ultimately conferred honor on the offending corporation.
Third, in the era of the "Ill Wind" defense procurement fraud scan85. Id. at 930. See id. at 927-32 (discussing the role that past sentencing data played in devising the first federal sentencing guidelines for individuals). See also Breyer, supra note 7, at 17-25.
86. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at D-1 (app. D).
87. According to the Reports of the Administrative Office, based on a fiscal year which runs
July through June, 46,725 defendants were sentenced in 1990. There were 44,524 sentenced in 1989,
and 42,902 in 1988. Comparatively, in 1984, 36,104 defendants were sentenced in the federal courts.
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1990).

88. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26 (tbls. following p. 24). The data
showed, for example, that approximately equal numbers of organizational defendants in the period
1988 through June 30, 1990 were insolvent, had net worths of $100,000 to $499,000, and had net
worths of over $I million. See id (tbl. 10).
89. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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dais, 90 extremely high profile insider trading prosecutions 9 and convic-

tions, 92 heightened concern for environmental crimes, and highly
publicized cases of corporate offenses such as the Beech-Nut adulterated
apple juice scam, 93 the public's attitude toward white collar crime was
changing. Many believed that courts had underpunished these offenses
in the past. 94 This public perception directly related to the Commission's

mission, because its enabling statute required the Commission to consider the "community view of the gravity of the offense" and the "public
concern generated by the offense" in drafting its guidelines. 9" Moreover,

Congress had itself written admonitions into the Sentencing Reform
Act's legislative history that current sentencing practices were
"creat[ing] the impression" that fines in white collar cases "can be written off as a cost of doing business"9 6 and that "white collar offenders...

frequently do not receive sentences that reflect the seriousness of their
offenses." 97 Given public and congressional views that the federal courts
inadequately punished economic crimes, data reflecting past sentencing
practices, especially as evidence regarding appropriate penalty levels,

were of limited utility to the Commission.
Fourth, and of related importance, Congress had recently raised the
maximum penalty levels contained in a number of fine statutes applicable
to organizational crimes.98 This action signaled congressional concern
90. The "Ill Wind" investigation alleged that payments were made to government officials in
exchange for secret information about pending government contracts. See, e.g., United States v.
McAusland, 979 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1992) (No. 92-960); Paula Dwyer, Nobody's Laughingat III Wind Now, Bus. Wx., Jan. 23, 1989, at
34.
91. See, eg., SEC v. Levine et al., Litig. Release No. 11,095 [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 92,717, at 93,481 (May 12, 1986).
92. See, eg., SEC v. Boesky, Litig. Release No. 11,288 [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,991, at 94,856 (Nov. 14, 1986) (involving a $100 million settlement for insider
trading); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,474, at 93,026 (June 20, 1989) ($650 million settlement for insider trading).
93. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 677 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
871 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCE3OOK

OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs-1985, 162, tbl. 2.23 (1985) (survey indicating

that 65% of Americans viewed sentences for white collar defendants as too lenient).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4), (5).
96. S. RP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 76.
97. Id. at 77.
98. See, eg., Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100174, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-700, 102 Stat. 4631 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 31 & 41 U.S.C.);
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that the penalties imposed were sometimes too low.99 It also meant that
the fines imposed in past cases would necessarily be poor indicators of
fine levels that would (or should) have been imposed had the higher statutory maximums been in force at the time the courts imposed the past
sentences.
Finally, evidence existed that prosecution policies were changing in the
years immediately preceding promulgation of the organizational guide-

lines. Specifically, it appeared that prosecutors increasingly targeted
larger, publicly traded companies during this period.'" 0 Thus, at a minimum, the Commission would have to scrutinize the data carefully before

it could assume that past penalties were germane to current organizational cases.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, empirical analyses of past
sentencing practices were useful to the Commission for the insight they
provided into federal organizational crimes and sentencing patterns. The
Commission ultimately collected the most extensive data base ever compiled1 °1 on sentences imposed by the federal courts upon convicted organizations, spanning the years 1984 through mid-1990. 1 2 These data
revealed the kinds of organizations sanctioned, the offenses for which

convictions were obtained, the penalties imposed, and key factors that
affected the nature of the sanction and the size of the fine. 10 3 The data
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 to 3207-39 (codified
in scattered sections of 12, 18, & 31 U.S.C.); Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). More recently Congress raised the maximum statutory penalty from $1 million to $10 million per count for antitrust
offenses. See Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
99. The House Report to the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 stated, for example, "The
maximum fine levels are currently too low and should be increased to the point where they can no
longer be considered a cost of doing business." H.R. REP. No. 906, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5433, 5434.
100. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 252; SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, tbl. 8 (showing increase in number of publicly traded corporations sentenced from 1988 to 1989, and an increased rate of such sentences in the first half of 1990).
101. One significant earlier study of illegal organizational conduct looked at cases from 1975 and
1976. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979). This study analyzed fewer total cases than
the Sentencing Commission's study, focused only on larger cases, and did not attempt to distinguish
between criminal and civil enforcement.
102. For a description of the empirical analyses conducted by the Commission, see SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at 1, D-1 to D-3 (app. D).
103. See generally id. at 17-21 (and corresponding tables). Among the more salient conclusions,
the Commission found that past fine amounts tended to increase as loss amounts increased, although
fine/loss multiples were higher with smaller loss amounts. Id. at 18. The Commission also found
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also allowed the Commission to "model" sentencing outcomes that could
be expected under the various draft guidelines it was considering, includ1 °4
ing the final set of guidelines ultimately promulgated to Congress.
In sum, while the data did permit the Commission to make reasonably
well-informed decisions with respect to the consequences of the guidelines ultimately adopted, the data on past sentencing practices provided
relatively little assistance in the development of a normative roadmap for
these guidelines.
With pure theory and past practice data both failing to chart a definite
course, what remained the best alternative for the Commission was to
develop policies for sentencing based on practical insight, informed judgment, a desire to achieve the key purposes of organizational sentencing,
and, perhaps most importantly, a willingness to formulate a rational and
reasonable compromise.
C. Toward PracticalConceptualizationsof Just Punishment and
Deterrence
Once the Commission recognized that the strict optimal penalties approach, as advanced by its proponent on the Commission, did not produce a consensus among Commissioners, the Commission embarked
upon a nearly three-year effort to find practical and effective principles to
guide its drafting of corporate sanctions. This process included: (1) formally publishing four sets of draft guidelines for public comment; 0 5
(2) circulating numerous informal working drafts to interested parties for
comment; (3) convening groups of academics, practitioners, judges and
probation officers to react to key drafts; (4) holding five public hearings
on organizational sanctions;1" 6 and (5) reviewing approximately 400 septhat fine amounts tended to correlate with the level of the most senior official who had knowledge of

the offense (i.e., highest fines were imposed when top executives were involved and lowest fines were
imposed when management personnel were not involved). Id. at 20. Loss and level of hierarchical
involvement are also significant for fine amounts under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,

§§ 8C2.4(a)(3), 8C2.5(b).
104. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at 21-24 (and corresponding tables).
105. Two draft "options" were published in 1989. See 54 Fed. Reg. 47,056 (1989). In 1990, a
Commission draft and a proposal the Commission published at the request of the Department of
Justice were also published. See 55 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1990).
106. In addition to holding a hearing on June 10, 1986, the Commission convened public hearings dealing with organizational sanctions on October 11, 1988, December 2, 1988, February 14,
1990, and December 13, 1990.
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arate written comments submitted from the public. 11 7
It was during this lengthy deliberative process that a consensus slowly
began to emerge with regard to how best to establish fines-the necessary
centerpiece of any set of organizational sentencing guidelines. This consensus view took shape early from a Commission-appointed "Corporate
Defense Attorney Working Group." The Commission convened this advisory group to determine whether a consensus approach could be devised that would take account of the multiple underlying complexities
involved in corporate sentencing.101 While this advisory group ultimately declined to suggest specific guideline proposals, leaving the details
to the Commission, the group submitted a set of general recommendations, urging "a system for sentencing of organizations... that provide[s]
proper incentives for organizationalmanagers to prevent crime, and that
punish[es] on the basis of harm and culpability." 109
The principles recommended by the advisory group embodied twin
premises: (1) that organizational fine guidelines should provide incentives
to companies that will reduce the likelihood of crime; and (2) that organizational punishment should vary according to principles of institutional "culpability." In 1990, as the Commission approached a new
amendment cycle,"' United States Sentencing Commission Chairman
William W. Wilkins, Jr., working together with the full Commission, distributed a memorandum proposing fifteen principles; these principles
were intended to guide drafting in what many hoped would be the final
deliberative phase before promulgation. After consultation and review,
the Commission unanimously adopted these principles"' and relied on
them, subject to important refinements over the succeeding months, to
produce the package of organizational sanctions ultimately adopted.
While the fifteen principles provided structural and substantive direction
in many respects," 2 the sixth principle, which provided that the guide107. Many of the submissions are lengthy, detailed and similar to legal briefs. These submissions
are on file with the United States Sentencing Commission, Office of the Communications Director.
108. Joseph E. diGenova chaired the group. Robert Bennett, Samuel Buffone, Ernest Gellhorn,
Robert E. Jordan, Carl Rauh, Bert Rein, Earl Silbert, Winthrop M. Swenson, Justin Thornton, and
Victoria Toensing also participated.
109. Letter from Joseph E. diGenova to Chairman William W. Wilkins, Jr., 1-2 (May 19, 1989)
(on file with the United States Sentencing Commission) (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 33.
111. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, app. A (setting forth the principles adopted).
112. A number of key principles directly influenced the guidelines actually promulgated. These
include: Principle No. (1), providing that restitution be required "regardless of any other sanctions
...imposed," id. (Principle No. (1)); cf. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B1.1; Principle No. (3), provid-
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lines "be designed to reduce fines for two primary reasons: to recognize
an organization's relative degree of culpability; and to encourage desirable organizational behavior,"'113 was especially significant. Interestingly,
these concepts-organizational culpability and what many eventually
' incentives to control crime-are in fact surtermed "carrot and stick"114
rogates for the traditional sentencing principles of just punishment and
deterrence. These goals became the cornerstones for the fine provisions
of the organizational guidelines. The guidelines fleshed out these principles, not by reference to abstract theory or inapt data regarding past sentencing practices, but rather by drawing upon the wealth of public
comment and expertise generated by its exhaustive notice and comment
and deliberative process. 1 5
IV.

A.

QUESTION THREE: HOW DID THE PRINCIPLES OF JUST
PUNISHMENT (ORGANIZATIONAL CULPABILITY) AND
DETERRENCE (CARROT AND STICK INCENTIVES)
SHAPE THE FINE GUIDELINES WITH
RESPECT TO KEY STRUCTURAL ISSUESWHAT OTHER FACTORS PLAYED A ROLE?

Compromise

In answering the third question, it is perhaps strategic to start with one
of the "other factors" first, since its influence was pervasive. This particular factor-the need to develop sentencing policy through reasonable
ing that offense seriousness "be based on the higher of the pecuniary loss, the pecuniary gain, or an
amount corresponding to the guideline offense level," SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26
(Principle No. (3)); cf. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.4; and Principle No. (10), providing:
Organizational probation is warranted when necessary (1) to ensure that a monetary penalty is paid; (2) to ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce the
likelihood of future criminal conduct; and (3) to impose another remedy that can only be
imposed as a condition of probation. Organizational probation may also be appropriate in
other circumstances. (Because of the lack of judicial experience with organizational probation as an independent sanction, the Commission should identify the heartland areas in
which probation is clearly appropriate.)
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26 (Principle No. (10)); cf. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8D1.l.
113. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at A-2 (app. A).

114. One of the earliest public expressions of this term was made during a congressional oversight hearing on the progress and direction the Commission was taking with respect to organizational guidelines. See Guidelinesfor OrganizationalSanctions: Hearings,supra note 44 (statement
of William W. Wilkins, Jr.). See also Winthrop M. Swenson & Nolan E. Clark, The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Three Keys to Understandingthe Creditfor Compliance Programs, 1 CORP.
CONDUCT Q. 1, 1 (Winter 1991).
115. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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compromise-influenced the determination of how other factors would
affect any fine calculus. As previously noted,1 16 by statutory design, the

Commission is a collegial body. Congress anticipated that Commission-

ers would reflect "a diversity of backgrounds" 11 7 and therefore, necessar-

ily, that the Commission "should be a body which can cooperate"'1 s as it
developed sentencing policy.

Congress' statutory requirements that the Commission be bipartisan,
comprised of judges and non-judges, and represent a wide array of background and experience, guaranteed a diversity of views.1 19 Congress gen-

erally assumed that the Commission's development of any sentencing
guidelines would necessitate sensible, action-oriented compromise. Because of the way in which the terms of the initial appointees to the Commission were staggered, the Commission's composition changed during
the time the Guidelines were under study. 120 Unexpectedly, however,
those Commissioners who subscribed either to the orthodox application
of just desert principles, or deterrence principles, no longer served when

the Commission prepared the final structure of the organizational Guidelines. 1 21 When the Commission finally voted on the Guidelines promul-

gated to Congress, the vote was unanimous. Several Commissioners,
however, made individual statements to prevent an interpretation that

they agreed with all of the provisions of the Guidelines merely because
they voted in support of the package of sanctions. The final product does
not reflect the view of any one Commissioner, but rather a consensus
122
view of what many hoped would represent a workable beginning

116. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
117. S. R P. No. 225, supra note 7, at 160.
118. In determining what size fines are appropriate for each offense, some Commissioners worried about fines that would be inadequate to deter or punish. In contrast, others worried about fines
that might over-deter and force legitimate corporations out of business or lead to an unwarranted
decrease in competitiveness. The fine structure ultimately adopted reflects these countervailing
concerns.

119. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991(a); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 159-60.
120. The seven members first appointed in 1985 were confirmed for terms varying from two to
six years. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(a).
121. The following Commissioners served on April 26, 1991, when the Commission voted to
promulgate the organizational guidelines: William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman; Julie E. Carnes;
Helen G. Corrothers; Michael S. Gelacak; George E. MacKinnon; A. David Mazzone; Ilene H.
Nagel; Paul L. Maloney, who was at the time the ex-officio, non-voting represenative of the Attorney
General; and Benjamin F. Baer, who served as the ex-officio representative of the Parole Commission
until his death on April 9, 1991.
122. As has been the case with the individual guidelines, the corporate guidelines can be expected to evolve. See generally infra part V.
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approach.
Because this Article has underscored the importance of compromise to
the drafting process, one should note that this compromise operated not
as a horse trading process of "this for that" between Commissioners, but
rather through mutual respect for such competing concerns as over- and
under-deterrence, and excessive and insufficient punishment. Similar to
the development process of the individual guidelines,12 3 compromise in
drafting the organizational guidelines consisted, first, of a group commitment to creating a reasonable and workable product. In order to settle
on a single unified approach, the search for the perfect could not become
the enemy of the good. 124 In the process of guideline drafting, this is a
particularly difficult principle to accept. With the advent of the Sentencing Reform Act, virtually all observers recognized the tremendous imperfections of the pre-guideline sentencing system, where, for example,
there was (1) no consensus regarding the purpose(s) of sentencing; (2) no
guidance regarding what constituted an appropriate sentence; (3) no appellate review for excessive severity or leniency; (4) almost completely
unfettered judicial and prosecutorial discretion; (5) no safeguard against
unwarranted disparity; and (6) no commitment to imposing sentences to
serve agreed upon articulated goals, such as deterrence and just punishment. Nevertheless, when the Commission took on the task of writing
rules to reform and improve this system, the temptation was great to
reject any attempt that had potential flaws. Eventually, the Commission
accepted that designing a perfect system was not within its reach. Thus,
the Commission's standard was whether what it proposed could improve
the extant system, not whether it would handle all of the complexities
and solve all of the inequities of the criminal justice process.
Against this background, compromise required the Commission 125
to
known;
be
could
what
of
limits
the
(1)
recognize:
candidly
and
openly
123. See generally Breyer, supra note 7.
124. See id. at 2 ("[I]n guideline writing, 'the best is the enemy of the good.' ").
125. For example, the Guidelines allow a court to reduce fines if a company had a qualifying
compliance program at the time of the offense. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5(f). While the
Commission provided substantial guidance in defining "an effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law," see U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k))), it deliberately did not
attempt to describe definitively the features that a qualifying program must contain. The Commission recognized that the "science" of what constitutes an effective program is still at an early stage
and that company specifies will influence effectiveness. Thus, the Commission defined only general
principles and provided examples, allowing companies flexibility to design programs that are appropriate for them. The Commission used this approach of "structured flexibility" throughout the
Guidelines.
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(2) various institutional constraints;12 6 and (3) other constraints, such as
the import of laws the Commission did not make1 27 and public perception of its work. 12 1 In these practical and necessary ways, compromise
played a vital role in allowing the Commission to resolve most of the key
issues it had before it.
Finally, the Commission deemed some problems intractable or insoluble without further experience and experimentation. The necessity of
compromise required deferral of these issues despite recognition of their
129
ultimate importance.
126. For example, experience informed the Commission that a desire to achieve uniformity
through overly-detailed and overly-complex guidelines can backfire, with complexity actually fostering inconsistent results. Consequently, the Commission devoted much attention to the reports of a
working group of probation officers. Assembling the group to review draft corporate guidelines, the
Commission recoguized that probation officers play a prominent role in the sentencing process. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(B) (requiring probation officer to prepare a presentence report containing
a proposed application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant's case).
127. The Commission was required to acknowledge the well-settled federal law of vicarious
criminal liability, and the possible applicability of non-criminal sanctions for the same conduct giving rise to the federal criminal sentence. See infra parts IIIC & IIIF.
128. Public perception affected at least one structural feature of the Guidelines. The staff used
15 drafting principles in the final effort to produce the corporate Guidelines. These principles directed them to consider a scheme that presumed highly culpable conduct (and therefore high fines),
but would allow a corporate defendant to "mitigate down" by showing less culpability. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26, at A-2 (app. A) (Principle No. (4)).
Although the Commission initially believed this approach might be desirable by forcing the convicted corporation to bear the burden of demonstrating reduced culpability, many commentators
believed this approach was unbalanced because it provided for only mitigating factors and not aggravating factors. Although either approach would lead to essentially the same result, the Commission
ultimately adopted a culpability measuring scheme that presumed average culpability but which
varied as a court considered aggravating or mitigating factors. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5.
The Commission wanted to prevent perceptions of a lack of balance to skew proper application and
understanding.
Yet another example of the influence of public perception centered on the determination that the
Guidelines would not permit a fine to go to zero dollars other than by way of departure. While the
Commission could identify the rare case in which restitution alone would serve the purposes of
deterrence and just punishment, it feared that a fine of zero dollars would be misinterpreted as a
repudiation of the government's decision to prosecute or of Congress' decision to proscribe some
behavior as unlawful. Many responded during the public commentary that the zero fine was subject
to this misinterpretation. Thus, the Commission directly prescribed no zero dollar fines in the
Guidelines.
129. The Commission discussed at length the question of whether and how to coordinate criminal and civil sanctions within each case. It was unable to resolve the issue, however, because no one
could identify workable solutions to the array of problems attendant to such coordination. See infra
part IIIF.
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The OverallFramework of the Corporate Guidelines: A Structural
Basisfor the Fine Guidelines' Focus on Just Punishment and
Deterrence

Before specifically discussing how just punishment and deterrence
principles shaped the fine provisions of the corporate guidelines, it is useful to understand how the fine provisions fit within the overall framework
of the corporate guidelines. Just punishment and deterrence became extremely important to the fine provisions of the Guidelines because Congress directed the Commission to foster these statutory purposes of
sentencing, 130 and because these purposes are, for the most part, not addressed elsewhere in the corporate Guidelines.
The Guidelines are comprised of three principal substantive parts.
First, "Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct"' 3 1 stands for the principle that, regardless of the culpability or fault of a corporation in committing an offense, it should "take all appropriate steps to provide
compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or
threatened by [that] offense." '3 2 Similar to the general statutory
scheme, 133 restitution, 134 which is solely designed to make victims whole
again, is completely distinct from the punitive portion of any sanction.'"
The second major substantive part of the Guidelines governs fines.
Here, the Commission divided convicted corporations into two groups.
"Criminal purpose organizations" are organizations that have "operated
primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means." '3 6
These kinds of organizations include, for example, those operating a
boiler room fraud scam, or engaging in hazardous waste disposal where
130. Some of the statutory purposes of sentencing that the Commission is directed to foster, see
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A), include just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
131. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, pt. B.
132. Id. (Introductory comment.).

133. See 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (authorizing restitution as an independent sanction).
134. Part B of the Guidelines (Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct) also authorizes remedial orders and a narrowly defined version of community service when these sanctions are more
suitable to remedy harm than restitution. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B1.2 (Policy Statement);
id. § 8B1.3 (Policy Statement).
135. The Commission recognized a possible exception to this general rule. In instances in which
the remedial costs stemming from an offense greatly exceed the organization's gain from the offense,
the costs of remedying the harm may appear punitive. In such cases, the Commission has authorized a possible departure from the Guidelines, especially if the level and extent of involvement by

those with "substantial [discretionary] authority" is minimal. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C4.9
(Policy Statement).
136. U.S.S.G., supra note 8,§ 8C1.1.
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the company had no legitimate means of disposing of the waste. 3 7 For
these relatively uncommon organizational defendants, 131 the Commission determined that the sentencing purpose of incapacitation 1 39 is most
apt. Accordingly, the Sentencing Guidelines direct sentencing courts to
set the fine for a criminal purpose organization sufficiently high to divest
the organization of its assets, if possible. 14
All other organizations are subject to a different set of fine provisions.14 ' These provisions mandate two basic calculations in determining
the applicable fine. The first calculation seeks to assess the seriousness of
the offense the corporation has committed. Under the Guidelines, the
court generally 42 determines the seriousness of the offense by choosing
the highest of (1) an amount from a table (corresponding to an "offense
level" calculation made under the individual guidelines); (2) the gain
from the offense; or (3) the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, to the
43
extent that the loss was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused. 1
Once the sentencing court makes this initial "base fine" calculation,
the actual fine level may vary substantially, according to the court's determination of the organization's "culpability score."'" As explained
below, 14 by crediting such corporate actions as whether the company
had a rigorous compliance program at the time of the offense 146 or voluntarily reported the crime to the authorities, 4 7 the culpability score is the
means by which the fine provisions of the Guidelines implement the sentencing purposes of just punishment and deterrence. The "culpability
score" establishes the applicable minimum and maximum multiple by
which the base fine dollar loss or gain is multiplied to produce the fine
range.
The third major substantive portion of the Guidelines governs proba137. Id. (comment. (backg'd.)).
138. From 1988 through June 30, 1990, the Commission found that in cases in which sufficient
information existed to make the determination, criminal purpose organizations comprised only
about three percent of all federal organizational defendants. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra
note 26, tbl. 7.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
140. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C1.1.
141. See generally id. §§ 8C2.2 to 8C4.11 (Policy Statement).
142. Exceptions to this general approach exist. See id. §§ 8C2.4(b), 8C2.4 (comment. (n.5)).
143. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.4(a).

144. See id. § 8C2.5.
145. See infra notes 157-87 and accompanying text.

146. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5(O.
147. See id. § 8C2.5(g).
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tion. Proceeding with a somewhat cautious approach, the Commission
recognized that the concept of corporate probation is still relatively new.
Thus, the Commission did not want to constrain unduly the development
of appropriate judicial experience with this sanction. Accordingly, the
Commission identified a number of specific, mandatory grounds for probation,14 8 as well as a list of recommended probationary conditions;14 9
beyond these directives, the Commission left the courts substantial discretion to impose probation in appropriate circumstances. 150 Some of
the specific mandatory bases for probation are to ensure that the court
can effectively impose another sanction,15 ' and to meet a technical
requirement of statutory law.'5 2 The remainder of the mandatory bases,
however, are generally aimed at the sentencing purpose of
rehabilitation. 5 3
As this general framework suggests, the corporate Sentencing Guidelines outside of the fines area quite naturally came to focus on sentencing
purposes other than just punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, the
attention that the fine guidelines devote to just punishment and deterrence is probably a natural consequence of what became the Guidelines'
emerging structure regarding non-fine sanctions. With a structural basis
for focusing the fine guidelines on just punishment and deterrence, the
real question for the Commission became not whether, but how to build
just punishment and deterrence principles into the fine guidelines.
C.

Vicarious Liability

Of all the conceptual issues presented, perhaps the greatest hurdle in
developing corporate fine guidelines was how to deal with the principle of
law that holds corporations vicariously liable for the criminal conduct of
148. See id. §§ 8Dl.l(a)(1)-(5), (7).
149. See id. § 8D1.4 (Policy Statement).

150. See id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(6), (8).
151. See id. §§ 8D.1(a)(1), (2).
152. See id. § 8D1.1(a)(7). This provision implements the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c),
which requires that a court impose a term of probation if the sentence of a convicted organization
does not include a fine. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8D1.1 (comment. (backg'd.)).
153. These rehabilitation-oriented grounds for mandatory probation generally signal weakness in
the corporation's institutional environment regarding compliance with the law. See id. § 8D1.1(3)
(company lacks a creditworthy compliance program at the time of sentencing); id. § 8D1.1(4) (company has a recent history of prior similar misconduct); id. § 8DI.1(5) (a senior company official
involved in the offense was involved in prior similar misconduct). The Commission has recommended that the sentencing court consider several probationary conditions aimed at rehabilitation
when imposing probation for any of these grounds. See id. § 8D1.4(c).
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their employees. 15 4 Under the common law, a corporation's criminal liability is derivative; the acts and intent of corporate officers and agents are
imputed to the corporate entity. Courts generally impute criminal liability to the corporation when an employee acts within the scope of his or
her employment and for the benefit of the corporation. Courts apply
these standards broadly,1 55 with some automatically imputing liability
even when an employee operates in direct opposition to express corporate
policy.' 5 6 The fundamental question for the Commission was whether
courts should make distinctions at the sentencing stage to reflect varying
levels of culpability, where the doctrine of vicarious liability requires the
courts to reject the same distinctions for the purpose of determining guilt
at the adjudicative stage.
The doctrine of vicarious liability presented an additional dilemma for
the Commission because it meant that very different kinds of corporations would be presented at sentencing, ranging from a company that
took reasonable measures to prevent offenses, but whose employees broke
the law despite its efforts, to a company whose senior management directed, or tacitly approved of the criminal offense. In order to facilitate
drawing reasonable distinctions among the many types of convicted orga157
nizations, the Commission formulated a "culpability score."
154. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909)
(upholding vicarious liability of a corporation for the acts or omissions of its employees). The Court
stated:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the
act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him... may be controlled, in
the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties
upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises.
Id.
See also Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime Regulating CorporateBehavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1247 (1979) ("[A] corporation may be held criminally liable
for the acts of any of its agents if an agent (1) commits a crime (2) within the scope of employment
(3) with the intent to benefit the corporation.").
155. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1962) ("The act is no less
the principal's if from such intended conduct either no benefit accrues, a benefit is undiscernible, or
•.. the result turns out to be adverse."); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137,
149-51 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding apparent authority sufficient to impose criminal liability on a
corporation).
156. City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir.) ("Even if an
employee is violating express corporate policy, the corporation might still be responsible."), cerL
denied, 113 S.Ct. 305 (1992); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.
1972) (imposing vicarious liability where the employee committed an act against company policy),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
157. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5.
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Based on factors specifically enumerated in the Guidelines,' 5 8 the culpability score is meant to provide an index that measures a corporation's
"good citizenship. 1 59 By assessing a company's crime-controlling actions, both before an offense occurred and in response to the offense giving rise to the conviction, the culpability score is designed to provide for
just punishment for the offense, as measured by the company's actions,
and deterrence, as fostered by the effects of the company's actions.
With respect to pre-offense conduct, the Guidelines require the court
to determine whether the organization took a strong, unequivocal stand
against violations of the law and effectively communicated its position to
employees and agents. The culpability index takes into account a company's "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law"'L--a
species of a compliance program. During the many notice and comment
periods on the various draft guidelines, the corporate community
strongly argued in favor of compliance programs having a substantial
mitigating effect on any potential fine. Corporate counsel asserted, for
example, that this factor reveals more about a company's "good citizenship" with respect to lawbreaking than any other effort. 6 ' Although the
Commission largely agreed, it determined that compliance programs
should receive credit only if they bear strong indicia of an institutional
commitment and due diligence in seeking both to prevent and detect violations of law.162 This is particularly important for larger companies
whose programs require more structure and formality in order to successfully reach far-flung employees. The Commission faced the difficult
task of providing definitions of what constitutes effective compliance programs, especially recognizing that courts need to be able to distinguish
genuine efforts to prevent and detect violations from paper plans
designed more for show than for effect. Attempting to define the contours, the Commission articulated seven mandatory "types of steps" in
the Guidelines.16 3 Moreover, the Guidelines require that fine mitigation
158. See id. §§ 8C2.5(b)-(g).
159. See Swenson & Clark, supra note 114, at 1; Obermaier, supra note 24.
160. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8C2.5(f), 8Dl.l(a)(3).
161. See, e-g., Letter from Walter D. Bradley, Assistant General Counsel, Dow Chemical Company, to the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 14, 1990) (on file with the United States
Sentencing Commission); letter from Donato A. Evangelista, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, International Business Machines Corp., to the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb.
13, 1990) (on file with the United States Sentencing Commission).
162. See Swenson & Clark, supra note 114, at 3.
163. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k))).
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for a compliance program be blocked for several reasons, including if a

senior official "participated in, condoned or was willfully ignorant of the
offense,""' or if the company discovered the offense but failed to volun-

tarily disclose it to authorities.165
The "carrot and stick" incentives to establish a qualifying compliance

program are fairly clear. If the court finds that an organization had an
effective program, a very substantial mitigating impact on the fine will

result.' 6 6 Conversely, if the court finds that a company (with fifty or
more employees) failed to establish an effective program at the time of
sentencing, the court must place the company on probation

67

and may

require that it satisfy potentially restrictive and demanding probationary
1
conditions. 68
The Guidelines reward post-offense "good citizenship" by examining
the corporation's post-offense conduct. On the one hand, if the corpora-

tion in essence ratified the criminal conduct by obstructing justice, the
corporation will face a stiffer sanction. 6 9 If, on the other hand, the organization strongly signaled its intolerance of lawbreaking by voluntarily
disclosing the offense,' 70 fully cooperating with enforcement officials in
the investigation,' 7 ' and/or demonstrating acceptance of responsibility

for the offense, it will receive a lesser penalty. 172 Thus, the fluctuating
penalty levels established by the Guidelines provide substantial incentives

for companies to take post-offense "good citizenship" actions as well.' 73
Two culpability score factors do not fit neatly into either the pre-of164. Id. § 8C2.5(O.
165. Id.
166. For example, assume a company's fraudulent failure to test a component of some military
hardware it was supplying to the government caused a $10 million loss. If no other aggravating or
mitigating factors applied, the typical fine range in this case would be $10 to $20 million, see
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8C2.5, 8C2.6, plus full restitution. See id. § 8BI.1. If the court found
that the company had a qualifying compliance program when the offense occurred, its fine range
would drop to $4 to $8 million. The company possibly could lower the fine even further if it fully
cooperated and accepted responsibility for the offense. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(2).
167. Id. § 8DlA(a)(3).
168. See id. § 8D1.4(c)(4) (allowing for "unannounced examinations" of corporate books and
"interrogation" of key officials).
169. See id. § 8C2.5(e). A corporation may obstruct justice within the meaning of the Guidelines not only by directing activities that have the effect of impeding some aspect of the criminal
justice process but also by "fal[ing] to take reasonable steps to prevent such obstruction" if it had
knowledge of the activities. Id.
170. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5(g)(1).
171. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1)-(2).
172. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1)-(3).
173. See generally id. §§ 8C2.5(e), 8C2.5(g), 8C2.6.
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fense or post-offense conduct category and only indirectly establish incentives for a particular course of action. The Commission intended
these two factors, "Involvement in or Tolerance of Criminal Activity" 174
and "Prior History"' 7 5 to reflect the need for the sentence to provide just
punishment for the offense given the offending corporation's culpability.
The first of these two culpability score factors-"Involvement in or
Tolerance of Criminal Activity"-gauges the hierarchical level and degree of discretionary authority of the individuals actually involved17 6 in
the offense. Generally, the more senior the position,1 77 and the greater
the degree of total discretion1 78 possessed by those involved, the higher
the culpability score and potential fine. The impetus for using this factor
as a measurement of organizational culpability or just punishment
emerged from the debate surrounding vicarious liability. Some questioned the basic premise of vicarious liability and argued that the Guidelines should impose no fine unless senior management was directly
implicated in the offense.179 This argument tracked a proposal in the
Model Penal Code that criminal liability generally should not attach to
the corporation unless a "high managerial official" was involved. 8 The
Commission responded to this argument by recognizing that it is simply
beyond the Commission's authority to revisit the doctrine of vicarious
liability. The Commission acknowledged, however, that some justification may exist for distinguishing between companies at the sentencing
phase based on the level and extent of managerial involvement. The
Commission ultimately embraced the position that an offense involving
174. Id. § 8C2.5(b).
175. Id. § 8C2.5(c).

176. See generally id. § 8C2.5(b).
177. Participation by

"high level

personnel"

generally increases

a fine, see id.

§ 8C2.5(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(3)(B)(i), more than participation by
"substantial authority personnel." See id. § 8C2.5(b)(4), (5). See id. § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k)))
(definition of "high level personnel"); id. § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(c))) (definition of "substantial

authority personnel"). The culpability score is not affected when other employees who do not fit
within these categories were involved in the commission of the offense.
178. The culpability score also increases if the sentencing court concludes that tolerance of the
offense by those exercising substantial authority was "pervasive." See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,
§ 8C2.5(b)Cl)CA)(ii)-(B)0ii), (b)C2)CA)(ii)-(B)(ii), (b)C3)CA)(ii)-(B)(ii).
179. See Comments of the American Corporate Counsel Association, supra note 39, at 3-4.
Comments of the Business Roundtable on the Proposed Guidelines for Sentencing Organizations 3
(Feb. 14, 1990) (on file with the United States Sentencing Commission); letter from Daniel J. Popeo,
General Counsel, Paul D. Kamenar, Executive Legal Director & John C. Scully, Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation 3 (Feb. 15, 1990) (on file with the Commission).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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corporate officials who exercise a high degree of the organization's discretionary authority deserves more punishment-for this higher level of
"organizational culpability"-than an offense in which such officials
were in no way implicated.
For these reasons, the culpability score provides for higher fines when
those with significant degrees of discretionary authority are involved.
Yet, the company is not exonerated from a penalty standpoint merely
because high level officials do not participate in the offense. When management has gone further than merely not being involved in the offense,
18
by taking affirmative pre-offense steps to reduce the prospect of crime 1
and post-offense steps to help ensure that those individuals who have
broken the law are held accountable,"8 2 then fines can drop to a relatively
83
nominal level.1
Since recidivism can indicate an ambivalent corporate attitude toward
violations of the law under certain circumstances, the Guidelines treat
the organization's prior history of misconduct as an indicator of higher
culpability. 8 4 The Commission appreciated that in large corporations a
violation of a state wage and hour reporting requirement in one sector of
the business might reveal little about corporate attitudes toward lawbreaking simply because an offense involving the unauthorized use of
public lands has occurred in another major division. Laws are numerous
and complex, and some companies are sufficiently large and diverse that
prior misconduct may not necessarily signal a higher degree of company
culpability deserving of an increase in the fine for the instant offense.
Thus, corporate recidivism counts in the culpability score only when
prior misconduct is "similar" to the instant offense and when it has occurred within the same "separately-managed line of business," if the
company is large enough to operate separate lines of business.18 5 In
other instances, the court may in its discretion decide to treat prior history as an indicator of increased culpability by choosing a higher fine
181. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5(f) (credit for an effective program to prevent and detect

violations of law).
182. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(l)(2) (credit for self-reporting and cooperation).
183. When an organization's management was not involved in the offense, it had a qualifying
compliance program, it fully cooperated with authorities and it accepted responsibility, the sentencing court will assign a culpability score of 0 and a fine range of 0.05 to 0.20 of the "base fine." See
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8C2.5(f), (g)(2), 8C2.6. In addition, in instances involving low organizational culpability, the Commission suggests that the courts depart from the Guidelines to consider an
even lower sentence. See id. § 8C4.11 (Policy Statement).

184. Id. § 8C2.5(c).
185. Id.
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within the applicable guideline fine range."8 6
In sum, the doctrine of vicarious liability presented the Commission
with the challenge of establishing guidelines that could rationally and
effectively sanction corporate defendants that would be implicated in the
criminal justice process under a wide array of circumstances. The

Guidelines attempt to draw distinctions between convicted companies by
gauging "good citizenship" with respect to pre- and post-offense conduct
and the role of senior management in the particular offense. In this context, the culpability score relies in part on a just punishment philosophy.

This view holds that companies that have demonstrated their commitment to complying with the law by a number of objective measures de-

serve less severe sanctions. Since many of these same measures
constitute crime-controlling actions that the company can elect to initiate
before an offense has occurred, or in response to it once the company
becomes aware of the offending conduct, the culpability score also embodies an incentive-driven deterrence approach.
D.

Guidelines vs. Policy Statements

Aside from the substantive issues of how to treat vicarious liability,
and the normative questions of what fines a company deserves and will

deter future crime, the Commission wrestled with the overarching question of whether it should attempt to establish corporate sentencing policy
for the courts through presumptively mandatory guidelinesI 7 or through

discretionary policy statements.'

A united business community argued

that the Commission should issue non-binding policy statements, emphasizing the unprecedented nature of sentencing laws for corporations, the
blurring distinction between civil and criminal violations, the absence of
186. See id. § 8C2.8(a)(7) (Policy Statement).
187. Sentencing "guidelines" are issued by the Commission pursuant to, among other potentially
relevant provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), application of guidelines by the court is presumptively mandatory:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the [guideline] range ... unless
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(2), (b)(3). If a court incorrectly applies the guidelines or
imposes a sentence other than that specified by the guidelines, the parties have a right of appeal. Id.
188. "Policy statements" are issued by the Commission pursuant to, among other potentially
relevant provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 994(2). In imposing sentence a court must "consider" relevant
policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). Sentences inconsistent with policy statements are not
reviewable on the ground of the inconsistency, and are otherwise reviewable only if in violation of
law or if "plainly unreasonable." See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(4).
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past sentencing practice data to guide guideline drafting, and the small
number of cases of organizational offenders relative to individual offenders on which the courts must impose a sentence. The business community argued that if a problem of unwarranted disparity or excessive
leniency later arose, then perhaps the Commission could convert a set of
amended policy statements into mandatory guidelines.18 9
United States Department of Justice representatives, along with those
in the community who strongly believed that history demonstrated a pattern of too much tolerance for corporate crime and excessive leniency at
sentencing for those few corporations convicted, urged the Commission
not to waiver on this critical decision by issuing non-binding policy statements which by law the courts could all but ignore. They emphasized
that the Commission had implemented mandatory guidelines for individual offenders, and argued that corporate offenders were no more entitled
to the benefits of lenity presumed to ensue from unfettered judicial discretion. In addition, they argued that the Commission's own review of
pre-1988 corporate sentences revealed that the fines imposed were often
less than the loss caused. They observed that this practice served neither
deterrence nor just punishment objectives and contributed to the public
perception that white collar crime was harming the country without an
appropriate response from the judiciary. Proponents of both positions
expressed their arguments regarding the question of guidelines versus
190
policy statements in strong terms.
The Commission's enabling statute was less than clear on this point. 91
Yet even those who believed that the Commission had a statutory obligation to issue guidelines conceded that the duty did not require fulfillment
within any set time period. Some believed that the Commission could
follow the counsel of the business groups and issue discretionary policy
statements initially, followed at a later time by mandatory guidelines.
After a protracted debate, the Commission elected to promulgate
189. See Comments of American Corporate Counsel Association, supra note 39, at 1-2; Comments of the Business Roundtable, supra note 179, at 1-2.
190. See, eg., Letter from the Associations Council, National Association of Manufacturers, to
the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 9, 1990) (on file with the Commission) (characterizing mandatory guidelines as a "death penalty," and "cruel and unusual punishment" for many small
corporate entities and employees); Amitai Etzioni, Professor, George Washington University, Remarks submitted to the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 17, 1990) (on file with the Commission) (entitled "No Valentine's Day for Corrupt Corporations," urging the Commission to
"ignore the self-serving cries of outrage by business interests").
191. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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mandatory guidelines for the key provisions, but to allow non-binding
policy statements to govern some less central decisions. For example,
mandatory guidelines govern restitution,1 92 the calculation of the applicable fine range, 93 and grounds for probation. 194 In contrast, non-binding policy statements guide remedial orders, 95 the court's selection of
the precise fine within the applicable guideline fine range,1 96 and, in general, the conditions of probation. 97
An explanation of the rationale that led to the Commission's decision
to favor mandatory guidelines is warranted because the various affected
constituent groups defined the guidelines versus policy statements debate
as a watershed. The Commission ultimately adopted a more guidelineoriented system for four primary reasons. First, Congress created the
Commission to bring greater certainty to sentencing.198 By definition,
mandatory guidelines sharply limit the courts' discretion. In contrast,
purely advisory policy statements may restrict discretion little or not at
all. The Senate's review of the experience with state guideline systems
demonstrated that non-mandatory guidelines failed to achieve their intended reforms because the judiciary largely ignored them.19 9 Little
doubt existed that mandatory guidelines would achieve greater certainty.
Other considerations being equal, the guidelines approach was most consistent with the Commission's general mandate.
Second, the Commission was able, over time, to develop an approach
that addressed the business community's chief concern that corporate
cases might be too complicated to be governed by binding "one size fits
all" sentencing rules. The Commission's favoring of guidelines over policy statements has been described elsewhere as "structured flexibility." 2"
This term embodies twin ideas:
The [corporate] guidelines should have sufficient definition to ensure that
sentencing discretion will be meaningfully guided and the generally desired
outcome achieved. At the same time, the guidelines should have sufficient
flexibility so that judges will be able to apply reasoned judgment to the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B1.1.
See id. §§ 8C2.1-8C2.7.
See id. § 8D1.1.
See id. § 8B1.2 (Policy Statement).
See id. § 8C2.8 (Policy Statement).
See id. § 8DI.4 (Policy Statement).
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)(B); S.REP.No. 225, supra note 7, at 41-50, 161.
S.REP.No. 225, supra note 7, at 79.
E.g., Swenson & Clark, supra note 114, at 2.

1993]

THE GUIDELINES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

sometimes unique issues, and frequently complex facts, raised by corporate
defendants.20

Consistent with this approach, the Commission framed many key definitions in the Guidelines in terms of both specific and general principles.20 2 With respect to fines, the applicable range from which the court
selects the precise fine amount is generally four times broader than the
range governing the terms of imprisonment for individuals.20

3

With re-

spect to corporate probation, this combination of structure and flexibility
provided for certain mandatory grounds for probation, 2' while in other
instances leaving the courts with the same level of discretion to impose
probation that they would have had if guidelines had not been
promulgated.2 °5
The third reason is related. The Commission felt reasonably comfortable with the specific mandatory provisions and degree of binding structure adopted because, by the end of the promulgation process, a
reasonable degree of consensus existed that the provisions formed a
workable basis upon which to begin to reform corporate sentencing practice. The Commission's open process of continually allowing members of
the public (including the corporate and law-enforcement communities) to
comment on guideline drafts allowed it to gauge this consensus.
Finally, with the emergence of the "carrot and stick" philosophy of
modulating fines to foster crime-deterring actions by organizations, it became clear that mandatory guidelines would better serve the statutory
goals set for the Commission. Asking a company, for example, to voluntarily disclose that it committed an offense leaves it vulnerable to a range
of potential sanctions including, but not limited to,2" 6 the criminal penalty. If companies cannot determine with a high degree of certainty that
their self-reporting will result in a substantial reduction in the criminal
fine ultimately meted out, the "carrot" for taking this action may appear
too indefinite to induce companies to self-report. Because non-binding,
201. Id.
202. For a discussion of how the definition of "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" comports with this approach, see id. at 2-3.
203. By statute, imprisonment ranges for individuals generally must be no greater than 25%. 28
U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). No similar provision was enacted to apply to organizational fines; the Guidelines
typically provide for ranges of 100%. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8C2.6-8C2.7.
204. See id. § 8Dl.l(aXl)-(7). But see id. § 8D.1(a)(6) (quite discretionary).
205. See id. § 8DI.1(a)(8).

206. For example, collateral civil consequences may result, including civil fines, shareholder derivative actions, and in some instances debarment. See supra part IIIF.
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discretionary policy statements do not ensure the definite results necessary to establish effective, crime-controlling incentives, they did not appear to serve the deterrence approach the Commission favored.
. The Coordination of Individual and Corporate Penalties
The tug and pull of competing ideas and the just punishment/deterrence-related theories behind the corporate fine guidelines led
to an important compromise regarding the coordination of corporate and
individual penalties. The Commission adopted the view that since federal law contemplates that both corporations and individuals may be
criminally liable for offenses,2 "7 and since Congress has provided an array of sanctions for both,20° there should be no direct and automatic offset in the corporate fine for penalties imposed on individuals. The
Commission made a limited exception to this rule for fines imposed on
substantial owners of closely held corporations.20 9
On the other hand, the Guidelines do provide conditionally for coordination. The condition is that the corporation must have taken actions to
increase the likelihood that the individuals responsible for the offense
would be held accountable for their illegal conduct. As corporations
take these kinds of steps, thereby lowering their own fine exposure, the
probability that lawbreaking employees will face criminal sanctions increases. In this way, the Sentencing Guidelines partially provide for coordination of corporate and individual penalties.21 0
To understand the operation of this conditional offset, one must recognize that the Guidelines' carrot and stick incentives encourage actions
that inherently create a "wedge" 211 between a company that wishes to
demonstrate its own "good citizenship" and individuals within the company who have violated the law. For example, a qualifying compliance
program under the Guidelines requires that the company diligently seek
207. Courts long have recognized that both a corporation and individuals within a corporation
may be held accountable by the criminal law for a given course of conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.) (affirming conviction and sentence of both corporation
and its president for filing false claims for government subsidies), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).

208. See, eg., 18 US.C. § 3551(a) (setting forth authorized sentences for individuals); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551(b) (setting forth authorized sentences for organizations).
209. Even this offset is discretionary with the court. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,§ 8C3.4.
210. As stated earlier, the Commission deferred more specific coordination for the size of the fine
when the responsible individual is sentenced to a term of imprisonment; it declined to resolve this
issue until more data became available to assess the variety of patterns and the frequency with which

each occurs.
211. See Swenson & Clark, supra note 114, at 3.
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to "detect" lawbreaking, 212 that it subject responsible individuals to appropriate "discipline," 2' 13 and, if the company has detected the violation,

that the company disclose it to authorities.214 The Guidelines also provide for mitigation for disclosure of the offense to authorities, 21 5 and for

full cooperation. 216 For cooperation credit to apply, the company must
provide, inter alia, "information... sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify . . . the individual(s) responsible for the criminal
conduct.

217

Each of the steps by which a corporation may reduce its own fine exposure is intended to have the ancillary effect of helping to ensure that
employees who have broken the law will be held accountable by the
criminal justice system. By fostering individual accountability, the
Guidelines should generally21 8 and specifically deter criminal conduct,
just as they coordinate the penalties for the corporation according to the
steps it has taken to bring about individual accountability.
F

The Coordinationof CollateralSanctions

In addition to criminal penalties, corporations that violate a federal
criminal law may be subject to substantial non-criminal penalties such as
debarment,2 19 treble civil damages, 220 and shareholder derivative actions. 221 Because these penalties can be significant, some argued that the
Guidelines should address these collateral consequences, preferably as an
offset against any potential criminal fine.222 Others argued that the crim212. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§ 8C2.5(f), 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k))).
213. Id. § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(k)(6))).
214. See id. § 8C2.5(f).
215. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
216. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(2).
217. Id. § 8C2.5 (comment. (n.12)).
218. It seems logical that if employees in companies are on notice that their employers can and
will detect, report, and fully cooperate in the investigation of offenses employees commit, then they
will be far less likely to commit such violations.
219. See, eg., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. § 9.406 (1991).
220. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1982).
221. See, eg., Mosez v. Welch, 638 F. Supp. 215 (D. Conn. 1986) (shareholder derivative action
against General Electric for allegedly submitting false claims in connection with government contracts and for subjecting the corporation to criminal charges). For surveys of such potential collateral penalties, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMMITTEE,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS, FINAL REPORT (Feb.

1991)

[hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Parker, supra note 30, at 13, tbl. 3.
222. As discussed below, practical difficulties prevented the Commission from following this
approach. Public comment urging coordination of criminal and collateral sanctions was typically
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inal sanction is unique and separate from any civil penalties, which often
are mere "costs of doing business," and therefore should remain dis-

tinct.223 Finally, some observed that a civil penalty offset would unduly
complicate the process, since a criminal case would likely precede any

civil action.224 Moreover, the Commission was concerned that courts
might be tempted to mitigate the criminal fine on the purely speculative

assumption that the corporation would subsequently suffer a civil penalty
of some unknown size.

For both substantive and technical reasons, the Commission ultimately determined to approach the matter cautiously. In the substantive
context, Congress has traditionally provided for multiple sanctions; the
history of legislative action suggests that offsets might be inconsistent in
some circumstances with congressional intent. Furthermore, recent case

law developments indicate that the courts are still in the process of
resolving coordination issues based on double jeopardy arguments. 225

Both of these considerations suggested that the Commission should allow
this constitutionally-grounded coordination of penalties to develop further before stepping into the arena. Additionally, offsets can raise complicated dual sovereignty policy issues if applied to sanctions imposed by
state and local enforcement schemes. On the other hand, offsets raise
vague regarding the best way to accomplish this goal. See, eg., Comments of the Business Roundtable, supra note 39, at 10.
223. See, eg., Letter from Arthur N. Levine, Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation, United States
Department of Health & Human Services, Food and Drug Division, to United States Sentencing
Commission (Feb. 15, 1990) (on file with the Commission).
224. See, eg., Letter from Steven A. Saltzburg, Member Ex-Oficio, United States Sentencing
Commisison, to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman (Feb. 14, 1990) (on file with the Commission).
225. See generally United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding disproportionately
large civil sanction imposed upon defendant who has already sustained a criminal penalty for the
same conduct may violate the multi-punishment prong of double jeopardy in certain circumstances);
United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.) ("Although in this case the civil penalty
preceded, rather than followed the criminal indictment, the Halper principle that civil penalties can
sometimes constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes would seem to apply
whether the civil penalties come before or after the criminal indictment."), reh'g denied, 907 F.2d
1145 (11th Cir.), cert denied, I11 S. Ct. 178 (1990); United States v. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. 536 (N.D.
II1. 1991) (holding that where the criminal prosecution precedes the civil proceeding, civil sanctions
remain available so long as they do not reach the punitive level; however, where civil sanctions have
already been imposed before a criminal proceeding is initiated, and those sanctions are deemed punitive, that option is lost because double jeopardy prohibits the second prosecution), aff'd, 974 F.2d
839 (7th Cir. 1992); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 117, 126-27 (1990)
("Although the double jeopardy provision only applies to successive attempts at criminal prosecution, the underlying philosophy for which the framers created the right is applicable in the civil
context as well, particularly where a contractor is continually forced to defend both its reputation
and its purse.").
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consistency concerns if they apply to federal civil and administrative
sanctions but do not apply to state and local sanctions.
In the technical context, coordination is difficult at best. Timing is the
most obvious problem of coordinating criminal and other sanctions. Because of the backlog of cases in the federal courts and the priority they
assign to the criminal calendar over the civil calendar, federal courts simply would not know at the time of sentencing what collateral sanctions, if
any, the corporation eventually will suffer.
The Commission resolved this dilemma by providing no direct offset
for collateral sanctions but by providing means by which they may be
taken into account. The Commission designed the Guidelines' fine
ranges to accommodate a "permissive offset." In general, the ranges are
226
broad; typically, the maximum of the range is twice the minimum.
Thus, the court can take collateral consequences into account in selecting
the precise fine to impose. Moreover, the Guidelines explicitly direct
that "the court, in setting the fine within the guideline range, should consider any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the organization's conduct.... [P]unitive collateral
sanctions [that] have been or will be imposed on the organization...
may provide a basis for a lower fine within the guideline fine range."2' 27
The Commission designed this compromise approach to leave courts
(which are best able to assess this particular factor) with sufficient flexibility to weigh collateral consequences appropriately.
It should be observed that if steep collateral sanctions are imposed on
an organization despite its having taken the kind of "good citizenship"
actions the Sentencing Guidelines recognize the collateral sanctions may
dilute the Guidelines' incentives for taking these actions, perhaps to the
point of rendering the Guidelines' "carrot and stick" approach ineffective. If the Guidelines' incentives contribute to controlling corporate
crime, this turn of events would be unfortunate. The Commission is
committed to monitoring and continuing to analyze this issue. For now,
because Congress has quite deliberately devised multiple enforcement
schemes, and given dual federal and state sovereignty issues, resolution of
this problem is beyond the Commission's direct control. The potentiality
of this problem may, however, weigh in favor of greater coordination
among the various enforcement authorities to consider adherence to the
226. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8CI.6.
227. Id. § 8C3.8 (Policy Statement, comment. (n.2)).
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deterrence-related approach of the Guidelines and, in any case, to assure
an overall enforcement policy that brings philosophical coherence to the
imposition of criminal and civil sanctions.
G.

The Size of the Corporation
The final conceptual issue central to the Commission's deliberative

process about what fines would simultaneously provide deterrence and

just punishment was whether the size of the convicted organization
should matter, and if so, how it should affect the size of the fine. 228 The
Commission's review of past practice data revealed that judges seemed to
consider the size of the offending corporation, but not in any discernibly
systematic way. One side argued that large corporations should pay

larger fines to prevent them from absorbing the fine as a cost of doing
business and thus making criminal violations efficient. On the other side,

some contended that when two corporations are convicted of a fraud that
creates a loss of $100,000, the sentence each receives should be a function
of the size of the loss, not the size of the corporation. They argued that

this latter approach was consistent with the emphasis in the enabling
legislation on uniform sentences according to the offense, not the offender.2 2 9 Rather than adopt any kind of a blanket approach, the Commission ultimately responded to this question in what it hoped would be

a practical, multifaceted manner.
As a general proposition, size does not directly bear on the computa-

tion of a corporation's fine. The same rules230 apply whether the convicted company is a "Fortune Fifty" manufacturing conglomerate or a
228. This debate emerged early on when the proponents of a strict just punishment approach to
corporate sentencing advocated "impos[ing] a fine in terms of a percentage of the organization's
income or wealth." PRELIMINARY DRAFr,supra note 56, at 162. In contrast, the optimal penalty
proponents flatly rejected the relevance of corporate size. See Parker, supra note 30, at 36 n. 152
(asserting that "little analysis is required to conclude that such a system achieves neither rational
deterrence nor any other legitimate objective of a punishment system").
229. While Congress did not intend to eliminate consideration of offender characteristics in
guidelines sentencing, its requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)-(e) that the Commission "shall ensure"
that the guidelines "are entirely neutral to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic
status of offenders" and that the guidelines "reflect the general inappropriateness" of considering an
offender's "education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and
community ties" suggest a decreasing emphasis on offender characteristics. See Van Graafeiland,
supra note 14, at 1293 (statutory mandate led Commission to concentrate more on harm caused by
the offense, rather than offender's characteristics). See also United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129,
132 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d
216, 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989).
230. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8A1.2.
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"mom and pop" dry cleaner. The way in which the seriousness of the
offense is computed 23 1 is not fundamentally influenced by size. Indeed,
the Commission ultimately saw no logical way of proceeding other than
by measuring offense seriousness consistently. Any other approach
would "capriciously overdeter] and underdeterol offenses by giving the
less wealthy [organizations] incentives to commit more harmful offenses,
'232
and vice versa.
After establishing the theoretical foundation of consistency, the Commission permitted several practical exceptions relating to size. First, in
233
contrast to the proposals of the orthodox optimal penalty advocates,
the Guidelines do not require a company to seek bankruptcy if a fine is
beyond a company's means. In this context, then, structured flexibility 234 entailed giving courts the discretion to reduce a fine to the extent
necessary to allow the company to remain viable,2 35 but also requiring
that courts consider whether supervision, by placing the corporation on
probation, is necessary.2 3 6
A second means in which size indirectly may become important involves the culpability score factor that assesses the role of management
or other senior officials in the offense. 2 37 As noted earlier, the culpability
score determines the number by which the sentencing court multiplies
the loss or gain or an approximation for the harm. When "high level
personnel ' 238 are involved or when tolerance of the offense by those with
"substantial [discretionary] authority" 239 is pervasive, the culpability
score is increased.' The amount of the increase, however, itself rises
with an organization's size.2 4 Thus, if a top executive of a 200-person
firm was involved, the culpability score increases three points, but if a top
executive of a company with 5000 or more employees was involved, the
culpability score increases by five points.
Probably more than any other compromise, no one was entirely satis231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
See Parker, supra note 30, at 555 n.172.
Id. at 585-91.
See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,§ 8C3.3(b).
See id. §§ 8D1.1(2), (7).
See id. § 8C2.5(b).
See id. § 8A.2 (comment. (n.3(b))).
See id. (comment. (n.3(c))).
See id. § 8C2.5(b).
See id.
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fled with the way in which the size of the corporation affects the fine
calculus. Some who voted for the package of sanctions that went to Congress are strongly critical of the Guidelines' consideration of size. Nevertheless, Congress indicated that the size of an organization may be a
relevant sentencing factor,242 and the Commission's approach considers
size in the Guidelines in a manner that may be defensible. Clearly one
could argue that when those who manage large numbers of individuals
have acted in a lawless manner, the risk of harm and the risk of recruiting others into lawbreaking is generally greater than when those with far
less responsibility are involved.243 In addition, from a culpability standpoint, "as organizations become larger and their managements become
more professional, participation in... criminal conduct by such management is increasingly a breach of trust or abuse of position." 2"
Third, the Guidelines consider the size of a corporation as it relates to
the expectations for a company's compliance program. Some early critics of the corporate guidelines posited that smaller companies might not
be able to receive credit for compliance programs because they would
lack the means to institute the kinds of formal compliance mechanisms
necessary for the sentencing court to find that the corporation had in
place an effective program to detect and prevent violations of the criminal laws.245 This assertion ignores the Commission's explicit commentary that "the requisite degree of formality of a program to prevent and
detect violations of law will vary with size of the organization: the larger
'
the organization, the more formal the program typically should be."246
In short, the Commission has indicated that as long as the corporation
satisfies the definition's general requirements, small organizationswhose management will be in personal contact with employees on a regular basis-can establish relatively informal compliance programs. In a
related vein, this explains the probation guideline requirement that a
court impose probation if, at the time of sentencing, the company lacks a
qualifying compliance program, but limits this requirement to corporations with at least fifty employees.247 One can expect highly informal
compliance programs in smaller organizations, making court supervision
242.
243.
244.
245.
1991).
246.
247.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(7).
See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8C2.5 (comment. (backg'd.)).
Id.
See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr., Big Corporations,Off the Hook, LEGAL TIMEs 22 (May 6,
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k)(7)(i))).
See id. § 8D1.l(a)(3).
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of the program's "implementation" of questionable necessity. The Commission's research indicated that indeed, small corporations will not frequently be able to qualify for compliance credit; this is not, however,
because they cannot meet the definition's criteria, but because top management will typically be involved in the offenses smaller companies
commit, 248 a factual occurrence that negates any credit for the compliance program.2 49
Recognizing this provided the rationale for a fourth way in which the
court may take account of size. The Guidelines permit courts to reduce,
on apro rata basis determined by a percentage of ownership, the fine of a
closely held corporation if its owners have been fined. Since most closely
held corporations are small, this should primarily benefit smaller
companies.
The question of whether and how to consider size was a particularly
difficult issue. It remains to be seen whether in striking a compromise,
the Commission found the right balance of considerations.

V. QUESTION FOUR:

ARE THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR

ORGANIZATIONS CAST IN STONE, OR CAN CHANGES BE

EXPECTED?

A.

The Corporate Guidelines as Evolutionary Law

Because the Sentencing Commission has now promulgated a set of
guidelines to govern the sentencing of both individuals and organizations, the Commission is sometimes asked what work is left to be done.
This question reflects a common misunderstanding of Congress' basic vision for sentencing reform.
First, Congress created the Sentencing Commission to be a permanent
agency-there is no sunset provision limiting the Commission's tenure.
Congress made the Commission a permanent agency because it expected
the Commission's work to be ongoing. Specifically, Congress mandated
that the Commission "shall review and revise [the guidelines], in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention. ' '25 0 Toward this
end, Congress directed the courts to submit to the Commission relevant
248. Reported data partially illuminate this fact. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26,
tbls. 8, 1I (showing that most federal organizational cases involve closely held corporations and
most involve cases in which owners were aware of or involved in the offense).
249. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8,§ 8C2.5().
250. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
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information on each sentence imposed under the guidelines,2 5 1 and instructed the Commission to analyze critically the data that the courts
2 52
supply.
Second, Congress provided the Commission with a statutorily defined
schedule and process, including a method for eliciting public comment,
by which the Commission is to make amendments to the guidelines.25 3
Congress expected the Commission to make amendments based on an
understanding of the actual operation of the guidelines and in response to
changes in the statutory definitions of the gravity of the offense and
changes in public attitudes toward the offense.25 4
Third, Congress identified as one of the guidelines' primary goals that
they "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. ' '2 55 The relevant legislative history explains that this provision "is designed to encourage the constant refinement of sentencing policies and practices as
more is learned about the effectiveness of different approaches. ' 25 6
Thus, based both on a relatively immediate review of how specific
guidelines operate in actual cases 2 57 and on longer-term research, 25 8 Congress expected the Commission continually to assess and, as necessary, to
amend the guidelines to ensure that they are as effective as possible in
meeting the purposes of sentencing.25 9 The Commission has more than
followed Congress' instruction to review and revise the guidelines by
making nearly 500 formal amendments (some substantive, some technical and clarifying) to the individual guidelines during the approximately
five years since they were originally promulgated.2 6
While predictions as to specific future amendments to the corporate
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

28 U.S.C. § 994(w).
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), (x).
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), (o), (p), (s).
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C).
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 161.
For a discussion of the Commission's monitoring efforts with regard to actual cases, see

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 39-142 (1991) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT].

258. Authority for the Commission's research activities is generally set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 995(a)(12)-(16). For a discussion of research recently conducted by the Commission, see ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 257, at 143-64.

259. For additional legislative history setting forth congressional views on Commission research
and ongoing refinement of the Guidelines, see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 7, at 178, 182.
260. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. c.
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Guidelines are neither possible nor particularly useful, it can be predicted
that the Commission will employ the overall approach of making revisions in light of experience and research, which will almost certainly lead
to modifications. There are a number of reasons why this is so.
First, the Commission has learned first-hand that case data reflecting
actual court experience with the guidelines is extremely useful in assessing whether a guideline is being applied as intended, and whether, even if
it is being applied correctly, it is fully capturing the most important factors of a given category of case. As noted, Congress expected that the
review of actual cases would be instructive; there is no reason to believe
that this process would be any less so with the corporate Guidelines.
Indeed, since the corporate Guidelines contain a number of groundbreaking measures, 26 1 one might expect case experience to be especially
helpful in revising the initial guideline structure and in pointing to ways
in which it can be improved.
The Commission's decision to ground the corporate Guidelines in an
approach of "structured flexibility" 262 will virtually require close scrutiny of guideline application in specific cases. The structured flexibility
approach means that courts and practitioners have a considerable measure of freedom in interpreting the intent of the corporate Guidelines.
While the Commission believed that this measure of flexibility made
sense, especially for an initial set of corporate guidelines, greater discretion increases the risk that the key goals of sentencing reform-such as
the promotion of certainty, uniformity and fairness in sentencing, and the
reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity 26 3-could be thwarted.
Accordingly, the Commission's structural approach to the initial corporate guidelines will, of necessity, require careful monitoring. This process, in turn, will likely lead to guideline refinements.
Recent history suggests that other forces may foster modifications in
the corporate Guidelines as well. As noted, changes in prosecution poli261. See supra note 31.
262. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
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cies 264

and public attitudes265 toward particular kinds of offenses can
provide impetus for change. Most importantly, changes in statutory law
can require guideline amendments.2 66
For these reasons, among others, the corporate Guidelines should be

viewed as an initial foray into an area of law that will evolve. The Commission has demonstrated its responsiveness to case experience, public
comment and other appropriate factors in refining the individual guidelines. The same can be expected with the corporate Guidelines.

.

The Development of EnvironmentalFine Guidelines
A final reason that the Sentencing Guidelines for corporations can be

expected to evolve is that the Commission deliberately deferred the decision whether to make the fine provisions of these Guidelines applicable to
all categories of offenses. Specifically, while the remedial and probationary parts of the corporate Guidelines apply to all federal Class A misdemeanor and felony convictions, 267 the scope of the fine provisions has
been limited to exclude environmental offenses, food and drug violations,
and certain other crimes.2 68
The development of guidelines to govern environmental offenses committed by organizations is an immediate Commission priority. In the
early spring of 1992, the Commission asked Commissioner Michael S.
Gelacak and one of this article's authors, Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel,
264. As an example of how prosecution policies may influence guideline amendments, the Commission recently studied prosecutor charging decisions with respect to money laundering offenses.
The study found that money laundering charges were brought in cases in which the seriousness of
the money laundering conduct varied significantly. In light of these findings, the Commission is now
considering whether "fine-tuning" the money laundering guidelines may be desirable. See 57 Fed.
Reg. 62,832, 62,839 (1992).
265. See generally supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
266. Over time, the Commission has considered or adopted guideline amendments in response to
the creation of new offenses, see, eg., 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832, 62,842 (1992) (inviting public comment
on possible amendments for a new federal caijacking offense), in response to increases in statutory
maximum penalties, see, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 8, Amend. No. 95 (app. C) (increasing guideline
sentences for certain sex offenses) and in response to statutory directives to the Commission, see, e.g.,
id. Amend. No. 364, (app. C) (implementing instruction to the Commission to provide for increased
offense levels for major bank crimes).
267. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8A1l, § 8A1.1 (comment. (n.2)).
268. See id. §§ 8A1.2(b)(2), 8C2.1. Technically speaking, the fine guidelines do cover all Class
A misdemeanors and felonies in the sense that guidelines exist that tell the court what to do for all of
these offenses. However, for what are referred to as "excluded" offenses, the relevant guideline
merely directs the court to consider general factors set forth in title 18. Among other "excluded"
offenses are RICO and export control violations. See id. §§ 8C2.1, 2E.l, 2M5.1, 2M5.2.
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to co-chair an advisory group of outside experts to consider issues relevant to the development of environmental sanctions for convicted organizations. Unlike some other advisory groups convened by the
Commission, the environmental advisory group's members were selected
specifically to capture the full spectrum of perspectives; its membership
deliberately maximizes diversity of views on the normative question of
what sanctions are appropriate for organizations convicted of environmental crimes. Its sixteen members come from the defense bar, corporate management, the enforcement community, academia, and public
interest groups.2 69 Its mandate has been to produce a detailed set of proposals for the Commission to consider, through a process somewhat
analogous to a negotiated rulemaking. Members have been asked to
think openly and critically, to "check their institutional agendas at the
door," and to act as a group of responsible citizen experts.
Since its initial meeting, the advisory group has labored for almost a
year to draft a detailed set of proposed guidelines for consideration by the
Commission. In March 1993, the advisory group agreed to make public
its first draft, and solicit comments from all interested parties and affected constituent groups. After a reasonable period of public comment,
the advisory group will review the comments generated by the publication of their draft, and thereafter present a refined and revised set of proposed guidelines to the Commission thereafter. The Commission will
then consider the advisory group's proposed guidelines in the course of
its normal deliberative process and will adopt in whole, in part, or none
of the advisory group's proposed package of sanctions.
Because the environmental guidelines pinpoint an area in which the
organizational Guidelines quite clearly will evolve, and because the subject of environmental guidelines for corporations has generated substantial interest, it may prove fruitful to summarize briefly the Commission's
reasoning for deferring coverage in this area.
269. Members of the advisory group are: Frederick R. Anderson, Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft; Stephen M. Axinn, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Jim Banks, Chemical Waste Management, Inc.; Meredith Hemphill, Jr., Bethlehem Steel; Jane Barrett, U.S. Attorney's Office; John
C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia University School of Law; Douglas I. Foy, Conservation Law Foundation;
Michael S. Gelacak, U.S. Sentencing Commission; Lloyd Guerci, Mayer, Brown & Platt; David
Hawkins, Natural Resource Defense Council; Andrew E. Lauterback, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Ray Mushal, U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental Crimes Section; Ilene H.
Nagel, U.S. Sentencing Commission; Judson W. Starr, Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti; John T.
Subak, Rohm & Haas Company; Jonathan R. Turley, George Washington University; Larry Wallace, Vinson & Elkins; and J. Bryan Whitworth, Phillips Petroleum Company.
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The over-arching reason why the Commission elected to postpone the
organizational fine guidelines' coverage of environmental offenses is that
there was consensus that these offenses might be sufficiently different
from other kinds of crimes that organizations commit to warrant separate treatment. The Justice Department shared this view, and accepted
the Commission's decision to defer coverage.
Four principal considerations led to this consensus. The first was the
potential difficulty in many environmental cases of defining and computing loss-a key measure of offense seriousness under the existing corporate Guidelines.2 70 Loss in environmental cases can be especially difficult
to determine for a variety of reasons. Clean-up costs can be equated with
a dollar measurement of loss in some cases, but in other cases clean-up
costs may not be fully known for years after the sentence in an environmental case will be imposed. In other cases, for example cases involving
air emission violations, there may be no ascertainable clean-up costs to
serve as a proxy for measuring the harm caused by the offense because
clean-up is not feasible. Furthermore, in the environmental context, the
calculation of the dollar amount of the loss can be limited to actual loss,
or not so limited, allowing, for example, projected losses to anchor the
dollar amount of any fine. Defining the harm in an environmental case is
also an issue that generates considerable debate. Some prefer to limit the
harm estimate to easily measured economic losses, while others insist
that the material degradation of the environment be calculated as well.
In developing sanctions for tax, antitrust or fraud offenses, the question
of defining loss or harm, and how they are measured was not the subject
of heated debate. In the environmental context, opinion is more divided
and views seem to be more strongly held.
A second reason why environmental offenses were considered to be
somewhat different from other offenses relates to the legal question of
scienter. Under various environmental statutes, unlike most other areas
of criminal law, a defendant corporation can be convicted on a showing
of negligence, or in some cases without any showing of specific or general
intent. For example, under the Refuse Act, it is a crime to discharge any
refuse matter into a navigable water of the United States (or into any
tributary that flows into any navigable water) without a permit. 2 7 1 Congress has deemed it appropriate to impute liability to corporations in the
270. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
271. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
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absence of a showing of intent because environmental offenses are likened
to public welfare offenses, long held by the courts as appropriate for strict
liability provisions. The question at sentencing is whether sanctions
should vary with culpability, even when the conviction has been obtained
under a strict liability statute.
In addition to the strict liability issue, there is the further question
about the nature of the offense. Under the Clean Water Act,2 7 criminal
liability may be imposed upon a person who knowingly or negligently
discharges a pollutant from a point source into waters of the United
States without an appropriate permit or in violation of a permit condition.2 73 The question at sentencing is whether the nature and the amount
of the pollutant should affect the severity of the sanctions; and if so, in
what ways and by how much.
Environmental statutes with a knowledge requirement may require
knowledge only with respect to the action, and not with respect to the
action's unlawfulness or consequences, or to the existence of any regulation or permit requirements. For example, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),2 74 it is a violation to knowingly
transport hazardous waste to an unpermitted treatment facility. 2" Liability attaches when the transporter knowingly transports hazardous
waste regardless of the transporter's mental state with respect to the
treatment facility's permit status. Thus, a transporter from whom the
treatment facility has actively concealed the revocation of its permit has
violated the Act just as completely as a transporter who negligently fails
to inquire about a treatment facility's permit or one who knows the treatment facility has no permit.
While the Commission was not convinced at the time it promulgated
the corporate Guidelines that prosecutors would frequently pursue
charges for some of the relatively less serious kinds of environmental violations, the fact that the environmental statutes could reach such conduct
had to be considered. The Commission's position was that guidelines for
environmental offenses should be able to account for the full array of
varied offense conduct which falls under the environmental crimes rubric
and that important variation in the nature of the offense conduct should
be reflected in any package of sanctions.
272. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
273. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c).
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
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The third reason why the Commission considered that environmental
offenses might be distinct from other offenses covered by the corporate
Guidelines is that, arguably, more than other kinds of offenses, environmental violations are subject to overlapping enforcement schemes and
collateral sanctions. State and local enforcement of environmental violations, for example, can be more co-extensive with federal enforcement
efforts than is the case with other frequently committed 276 organizational
offenses, such as government procurement fraud, tax or antitrust
violations.
The fourth principal reason to treat environmental crimes separately is
because opinion is so divided as to how to balance concerns for the environment with concerns for corporate effectiveness. On the one side,
there are those who attach the highest priority to environmental protection; generally, those of this persuasion prefer sanctions that are high
enough to deter any and all corporate environmental crimes. On the
other side, there are those who attach the highest priority to unrestricted
corporate conduct. Those of this persuasion prefer no criminal penalties,
for they fear over-deterrence and abhor regulation. In between these two
polar opposites are those who seek a mid-position that balances concerns
for the environment with concerns for the cost of regulation. In the environmental context, these positions appear to be felt passionately, each
believing in the moral virtue of their position. In contrast, in the context
of most fraud or tax violations, the views are not so divided nor the positions so strongly held, and few stand up and defend the offenses as noncriminal in nature, or attack Congress as misguided for defining the prohibited conduct as criminal.
For all of these reasons-and the implications they may have for such
matters as whether the credit or definition for environmental compliance
programs ought to be the same as for other corporate offenses-inter
alia, the Commission decided to defer promulgation of guidelines for environmental offenses. The development of environmental guidelines will
constitute an important next step in the evolution of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines.
276. During the period 1988 though June 30, 1990, approximately 10% of federally prosecuted
organizational crimes were environmental. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 26 (tbl. 1).
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CONCLUSION

The Commission did not, we believe, intend to focus on corporate offenders when it began its task of promulgating sentencing guidelines.
Yet, for all the reasons herein articulated, a consensus emerged that corporate offenders were neither exempt nor should be exempted from Congress' scheme for sentencing reform. And so it was that corporate
Sentencing Guidelines came to pass.
It is far too early to tell whether in responding to the myriad concerns,
and the competing agendas, the right balance has been struck. The hope
is that the corporate Guidelines will increase deterrence and if not, will at

least provide a structure for the imposition of just punishment for those
organizations convicted of these offenses. As with all sentencing guidelines, the goal is to increase uniformity, fairness, and certainty, and to
reduce the commission of crime; the hope is to achieve these goals without compromising the courts' ability to mete out appropriate sanctions
for convicted offenders and to have a system of sentencing responsive to
the societal need to reduce the impact of crime.

